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Abstract 
 
International relations have been marked by increased intra state ethnic conflicts which are 
able to cause huge humanitarian disasters and harbour instability and various threats for the 
international community. As a result, conflict resolution as a long-term process combining 
social, economic and political levels and activities concerning structural change has been 
advocated in recent years. In that sense, the post-Cold War era implies intensification in the 
attempts by the EU to become an actor in conflict resolution attempts in various war-torn 
parts of the world by employing various instruments. The disaster in Kosovo has been the 
renowned as the external stimuli for the rapid development of EU capabilities and 
convergence between member states at the policy level. From the very beginning the EU has 
been continuously expanding its engagement in Kosovo; which, today, has reached to the 
status of the main actor on the ground. Current situation sets forth the motivation for this 
study: despite the extensive involvement of the EU in Kosovo, the question of its impact. 
Which is shaped by many factors remains ambiguous. Thus, the main goal of the research is 
to inquire the policy impact of the EU in conflict resolution and the pattern which (re)shapes 
the impact given the comprehensive structures and capabilities employed by the EU. In that 
sense, the study conducts in-depth case study of Kosovo informed by comprehensive conflict 
resolution theory. Throughout the paper, the EU foreign policy and conflict resolution is put 
under constructivist lenses, i.e. structural foreign policy which acknowledges the co-existence 
of goal and norm-oriented foreign policy behavior. A comparison with Macedonia is also 
conducted in order to highlight the importance of conditioning factors and the EU 
engagement further. At the end, the paper discusses that the policy impact of the EU is shaped 
by the dynamic relationship between conditioning factors, EU conflict resolution engagement 
across political capacity building, economic reconstruction and local capacities developed as 
an outcome of EU engagement. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The post-Cold War era has witnessed tremendous change in the conflicts erupted all over the 
world. The new conflicts are different from the traditional Clausewitzean wars, which are 
fought by organized power centres, i.e. the nation states, against each other in line with the so-
called national interests. This type of conflict is generally planned at the state level, led by the 
professional armies and does not aim at the mass-killing of civilians. They are, broadly 
speaking, fought within “the international rules of the war” or jus in bello. However, 
especially after the disappearance of the East-West divide, today, most conflicts erupt 
between parties within the state borders over the access to economic resources or political 
power (Sisk, 2004: 250). Gurr argues that inter-ethnic conflicts have become “the major 
challenge to domestic and international security in most parts of the world” after the Cold 
War (Gurr, 1993:314). 
 
Multi-ethnic countries in the Balkans, Caucasus, Africa, and Latin America have been 
dragged into increased mobilization along sub-identity lines and hatred has become an 
institutionalised feature of many societies. In that sense, identity conflict is considered to be 
the new type of war (Holsti, 1996; Singer, 1996), which are no longer about foreign policy, 
security or interests of a country but “about statehood governance, and the relative role and 
status of different nations and communities within states” (Holsti, 1996: 20-1; see Table 1.1 
for a comparison). “Depending upon the nature of the group and contextual situation, this 
includes struggles for access, for autonomy, for secession or for control” (Miall, et. al. 2004: 
31).  
 
 
 
 
-[Demaere Oiie]: “It did not matter who governed, or thought they governed, the Benbilis; the politics of reality 
concerned the power struggle between A-Io and Thu.”
  
 
-“The politics of 
 
reality” 
 
Shevek repeated.
 
He looked at Oiie and said “that’s a curious phrase for a physicist to 
use.”
 
 
-“Not at all. The politician and the physicist both deal with the things as they are, with real forces, the basic 
laws of the world.”
 
 
-“You put your p etty miserable ‘laws’ to protect wealth, your ‘forces’ of guns and bombs, in the same sentence 
with the law of entropy and the force of gravity? I had thought better of your mind, Demaere!” 
 
 
  
Ursula LeGuin, The Dispossessed  
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Features Traditional Wars of 20th Century Ethno-Political Wars 
Political Goals Foreign policy interests of states Creation of new forms of power based on 
ethnic identities 
Ideologies East-West divide, democracy, fascism etc. Tribalism/communalist ideologies 
Mobilization Professional armies, conscription based on patriotism Fear, corruption, ethnic affiliations 
External 
Support 
Superpowers of Cold War, previous colonial 
powers 
Diaspora, regional powers, international 
organized crime groups 
Mode of 
Warfare 
Organised warfare, clearly demarcated front-
lines 
Para-military/criminal groups, child soldiers, 
use of mass killing, rape, atrocity 
War Economy Taxation, state resources Smuggling, drug-trafficking etc. 
 
 
 
Table: 1.1 Traditional Wars and Ethno-Political Wars, Source: Kaldor, M., Vashee, B., 1997:7-19 
Consequently, conflict resolution has been evolving in terms of efforts and actors in 
accordance with the changing character of conflict. Especially, actors operating at the regional 
level have become an “independent, and frequently powerful, factor in the security equation” 
(Buzan and Waever, 2003:481) in the post-Cold War period. The European Union (EU) has 
also risen as a foreign policy actor with continuously developing civilian and military tools of 
engagement in conflict resolution and has increasingly been suggested as an institutional role 
model to the other actors (cf. Buzan and Waever, 2003, Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, Salmon, 
2002). In that sense, the Western Balkans has become both a learning process and test case for 
the EU as an actor of conflict resolution for various reasons, where the crisis in Kosovo is a 
turning point in EU policy (Bartlett & Samardzija, 2000). 
 
Until the Kosovo crisis, conflict resolution had not taken the peculiarities of the region into 
consideration and turned out to be a “failure of the EU to handle the Yugoslav crisis and to 
come up with a coherent policy for the region” (Demetropolou, 2002:92). The Kosovo crisis 
has ignited the political will on the side of the EU for institutionalization of relations and 
longer-term commitment into the region1. The EU has operationalised multiple instruments 
linking the first and second pillar and has become an actor of conflict resolution with multi-
dimensional instruments. Moreover, the EU has increasingly come to realise that assistance 
and state building are not enough for conflict resolution given the expanding socio-economic 
gap between the EU and its closest neighbourhood. The new approach has been supporting 
Europeanization2 of the whole region and the possible future inclusion of countries into the 
EU as a part of conflict resolution.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1
 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, March 2000. 
2
 There is not a commonly acknowledged meaning of Europeanization in the current literature. Since the aim of 
this research is not to discuss the definition and features of Europeanization, a broad definition of the concept is 
adopted here which states that Europeanization “encompasses the penetration of European rules, directives and 
norms into the otherwise differentiated domestic spheres” (Mair 2004:341, original italics). Here, the emphasis is 
on the domestic change on third parties caused by the Europeanization. The outcome of this process might or 
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Considering these developments together with institutional change and capacity development 
in the field of conflict resolution and expanding involvement of the EU in the neighbourhood, 
analysing the Union as a conflict resolution actor provides a fertile ground as a research 
enterprise. The main concern of this study is the policy impact of EU engagement in conflict 
resolution, how it is practiced, in other words how the EU contributes to conflict resolution in 
the countries that are emerging from violent ethno-political conflict. In that sense, Kosovo 
represents the deepest involvement of the EU with multiple instruments in conflict resolution 
and after the declaration of independence, the EU is now the most desired actor on the ground 
by Kosovar Albanians3. For this reason, conflict resolution in Kosovo has been chosen as a 
case study in order to analyze the impact of a “cross-pillarized” way of engagement and 
combination of stability, transition and prospect of integration within the framework of 
conflict resolution. At the end, a comparison between the EU’s impact in Kosovo and 
Macedonia4 is also conducted. The overall objective is to improve the understanding of how 
efforts by the EU contributes to conflict resolution through examining the implications, 
outcomes and effects of relevant EU policies and actions. 
 
After some conceptual clarifications, the study proceeds with the explanation of the method 
used for the research, which will draw a framework for the case study. Then, a review of the 
existing literature and explanation of theories employed in this study follow. The individual 
analysis of the Kosovo case will empirically clarify the EU’s impact on resolving the conflict. 
A short comparative study between Kosovo and Macedonia is deemed to enrich the 
understanding of the EU’s policy impact, incremental process and trial-error path. The 
analysis part will discuss the policy impact of the EU in conflict resolution linking theory and 
empirical study. Lastly, the concluding chapter will provide an overall analysis and point to 
challenges and prospects of further research. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
might not be membership into the Union. For more detailed definition of Europeanization see Featherstone and 
Radaelli (eds), 2003; Mair, 2004; Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso, 2001 and Vink, M. P. 2003 
3
 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs in Ankara, Turkey, author’s interview, May, 2009. 
4
 Macedonia, henceforward, refers to the constitutionally demarcated and internationally recognised boundaries 
of the Republic of Macedonia without any reference to the northern Greece.  
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2 Conceptual Clarifications 
2.1 Conflict  
Conceptualizing conflict is a necessary first step to analyse conflict resolution. Generally 
defined, conflict means the pursuit of incompatible goals by different parties. However, the 
concern of this study is armed or violent ethnic conflict, which includes direct physical 
violence against a group of people. As stated by Miall et. al., in armed conflicts, the violence 
is generally mutual and unarmed civilians are targeted in a structured way, sometimes taking 
the form of ethnic cleansing (Miall et. al., 2004). Furthermore, these are generally asymmetric 
conflicts arising “between dissimilar parties such as a majority and minority, an established 
government and a group of rebels” (ibid: 12).  
 
Ethno-political conflicts arise when “at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, 
its causes, and potential remedies, along ethnic identities”. Generally, there is a lack of 
recognition and claims for broader rights or equality status “to preserve, express and develop” 
the ethnic identity when the titular nation has monopolized the governance and institutions of 
the state and is unresponsive to the demands of ethnic communities (Wolff, 2004:1). At this 
point, the opportunity cost of intra-state armed conflict is low for the groups due to the lack of 
reach to economic resources and representation.   
 
It is important to underline the causes or the sources of ethno-political conflicts in order to 
analyse them. The causes are neither purely international nor domestic. There are both global 
and regional sources of conflict, affecting the intra-state affairs either through supporting 
antagonistic social relations or spill-over of a conflict into the region. The role of the elites 
exploiting communal differences and triggering further mobilization and hatred is also an 
important factor in conflict (cf. Fouskas, 2007; Azar, 1990).  
 
At the end of a violent conflict, there is often no central authority, legal or security order. The 
economic conditions are generally ravaged by the war and deep hatred within the society 
against ‘the other groups’ is common sense. Moreover, dynamics of conflict are constantly 
evolving even after the termination of violence. Players, issues and strategies change and new 
ones appear, accumulating as the conflict protract and making the task of conflict resolution 
more challenging (Oberschall, 2007).  
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2.2 Stages and Features of Ethno-political Conflict 
There are different stages of ethno-political conflict. The lifecycle of a conflict is basically 
illustrated below.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Stages of Ethno-political Conflict, Source: Miall et al., 2004: 15 
 
The scope of this study comprises the post violent-conflict stage, which is conflict 
transformation and social change. However, there are no clear-cut boundaries between these 
phases as shown in the Figure 2.1. There are expected to be a lot of reversing and recycling 
over these stages until a sustainable peace is established (Oberschall, 2007). Since these 
stages are intertwined, eventually, the social change requires the termination of violence and 
sustainable elimination of the intentions to return to conflict. If the transformation of existing 
relationships and interests do not take place, there might be a return to conflict formation in 
the future.  
2.3 Conflict Resolution 
There are many definitions in the current literature about the meaning of conflict resolution 
and the relation between different concepts linked to conflict studies. Without going into the 
deeper discussion within the literature, the generally accepted definition is adopted in this 
study. In this sense, conflict resolution means all the efforts combining social, economic and 
political levels and activities concerning mediation, negotiation, peace-building, state 
building, reconciliation and structural change. It implies an overall change in the driving 
attitudes for violent behaviour through addressing the root causes of the conflict (Miall et al, 
2004: 21). Hence, it is used interchangeably with conflict transformation, which is a 
comprehensive term used to imply a process of transformation at all levels of the society and 
state. Overall, it involves a process comprising various functions and activities after the cease-
fire from refugee settlement to establishing democratic governance and economic 
reconstruction. It includes the challenging task of integration of the former adversaries into 
the new system without which stability cannot be achieved (Jeong, 2005). These terms differ 
from conflict management, which is used to denote immediate termination, mitigation or 
  6 
containment of the conflict (Miall et al, 2004: 21), usually through military and civilian 
engagement by third parties. Thus, conflict resolution and transformation are the deepest level 
of change (ibid.) and “the process of introducing new ideas as a search for security at the 
individual, group, community, and national levels following the traumatic effects of civil 
war” (Morgan, 2005: 75).  
 
Today, conflict resolution has widened to include state building, development cooperation, 
civilian and police tasks. An all-encompassing conflict resolution requires broader strategies 
and multi-level engagement with various instruments by multiple third parties. Thus, the main 
elements of conflict resolution are “establishing security, renewal of government institutions, 
possibly sowing the seeds of democracy, and socio-economic rehabilitation and development” 
(Voorhoeve, 2007: 23). 
2.4 Third Party Involvement 
 
 
 
 
Intra-state ethno-political conflicts are not isolated. As a result of large human causalities and 
interdependence of threats to security, it is hard to keep silent for the international community 
(Miall et. al, 2004). There are two reasons for third parties to get involved in ethno political 
disputes: Firstly, the parties to the conflict are unable to solve the dispute in a non-violent 
way, and secondly, the international community is not willing to support secessions tacitly by 
not taking action (Schneckener, 2008). The role of the external stakeholders in 
implementation, monitoring and reconstruction becomes crucial under the conditions of a post 
violence situation (Oberschall, 2007:187). 
 
A third party is “an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or 
remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate 
the termination of the crisis itself” (Young, 1967 cited in Mial et. al., 2004). Generally, third 
parties are considered to be neutral actors; however, in reality third parties are not neutral in 
“principles, procedures, and sometimes even outcomes (e.g. non-acceptance of secession)” 
(Schneckener, 2008). The third party may impose pressure on both sides including sanctions 
or use of force in order to get the desired outcome. Generally, there are multiplicities in third 
parties addressing different levels of the conflict, which can be termed as labour sharing 
depending on the capacities of each one. We generally see a mix of instruments with, 
sometimes, competing aims and agendas. They also have to deal with external spoilers or 
allies besides local parties to the conflict. The EU, in this sense, is an example of a third party 
engaging in conflict resolution. 
 
The figure below represents the overall conflict process with a focus on third party 
involvement where conflict resolution has achieved, at least, the basic aim of establishing 
peace and intention for co-existence between the belligerents. As a result of third party 
intervention, the asymmetry in the relationship is targeted and conflict is expected to 
transform into peaceful relations and co-existence as shown in Figure 2.2.  
 
“Most outsiders falsely believe that the date of their arrival is year zero for
 
the country, as if nothing had 
happened before them. In other words, we tend to function as if we could rebuild a society without first 
identifying and recognizing local existing resources.” (Puoligny, 2004: 7)
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Unbalanced Power                                    Awareness, Conscientization                          Mobilization, 
Empowerment 
(oppression, injustice, latent conflict) 
 
                                              
                                                         Confrontation/Overt 
Conflict
 
                                 Agreed Relationship
                              
                                                                                                                                           Balanced Power 
Changed Attitudes  Negotiation/Mediation 
                                                                                                  
           Changed Relationship/New Power Balance 
 
                                                                                        
 
Figure 2.2 Third Party Involvement, Source: Miall et al., 2004: 17, cited from Francis, 1994. 
2.5 European Union Foreign Policy 
EU conflict resolution has been understood under the broad umbrella of European Union 
Foreign Policy (EUFP), which operates across the three pillars of the Union, where 
“functional indivisibility of foreign policy has led to the rise of cross-pillar politics” 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008:31). In other words, the foreign policy activities of the 
Union are “broadly defined to include the competence or purview of the EC, the EU, CFSP, 
or a mixture thereof- have expanded to cover nearly all areas and issues of international 
politics” (Ginsberg, 2001:3, see also White, 2001). Furthermore, EUFP constitutes “security 
governance” with the presence of multiple and separate authorities, public and private actors, 
formal and informal arrangements, structured by norms and discourse; and directed to 
particular policy outcomes (Webber, et. al., 2004:3). Thus, the approach adopted in this study 
sets EUFP within “a wider set of multi-level foreign policy”. 
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3 Literature Review: EU Foreign 
Policy and Conflict Resolution 
The literature on the EU in general and conflict resolution under CFSP and ESDP in 
particular evaluates EUFP from different angles. This part will summarize the main literature 
on CFSP and ESDP, which the study mainly relies on as the secondary sources.  
 
The wide literature on EUFP has been focused on the “normative model” aspects of the EU in 
external relations (Manners, 2002:253). It gives priority to stating the distinctive character of 
the EU as a foreign policy actor. Variant concepts of “civilian power” have been introduced in 
order to capture the nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor; such as normative power 
(Manners, 2002; Sjursen, 2006; see Hyde-Price, 2006 and Merlingen; 2007 for critiques of the 
normative power argument), structural foreign policy actor (Keukelaire and Mac Naughtan, 
2008), norm-maker (Bjorkdahl, 2005 and Checkel, 1999), soft power (Nye, 2004) and 
cosmopolitan polity (Eriksen, 2006). According to Manners, the EU is a normative power 
because of “its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (2002:239). 
Its value-rational conduct embedded value of peace, democracy and rule of law or “what the 
EU is” rather than “what the EU does”, i.e. substantive legitimacy, shapes its normative 
dimension. In the literature, norm is considered to be “a close conceptual affiliate of the term 
‘legitimacy’” (Merlingen, 2007:439). 
 
However, with increasing autonomous military operations beyond the borders of the EU, the 
debates have shifted to discuss to what extent the benign character of EU normative power 
has been damaged or preserved (Smith, 2000; Manners, 2006). The main argument states that 
“strengthening the cosmopolitan dimension to international law would be a strong indicator 
for ‘normative’ or ‘civilizing’ power values of democracy and human rights” (Sjursen, 
2006:249); and the developing military and security capabilities under ESDP will be used “in 
the name of norms and values which confer upon the EU project itself the legitimacy which 
alone allows it to continue its journey to an unknown destination” (Howarth, 2000: 90; see 
Manners, 2006 for a contrary discussion).Within this framework, the EU’s international 
identity is described as another dimension of Europeans multi-faceted identities (Manners and 
Whitman, 2003).  
 
The literature on conflict resolution, on the other hand, generally focuses on the role of the 
UN. The underemphasised nature of the EU in relation to conflict resolution is to some extent 
due to the fact that the EU is relatively new in this area. The tendency in the EU studies to 
overlook broader studies of peace and conflict research might be attributed to the fact that the 
literature relates policy outcomes to political decision-making of the EU and incoherence in 
relative processes. In other words, the literature has so far focused on the internal dynamics 
and problems of the EUFP, thus lacking a proper bridge between EU foreign policy studies 
and peace and conflict research. The literature on EU crisis management and conflict 
resolution together with the development of ESDP has mostly been descriptive,  at best (e.g. 
Smith, 2002; White, 2001; Duke, 2002) and has evolved around the EU’s sui generis nature 
(e.g. Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Smith, 2003).  It emphasizes the multi-dimensional 
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instruments employed abroad with an aim to extend the internal zone of peace to its 
neighbourhood. The debate has evolved around the EU’s unique contribution with its 
cosmopolitan norms and multi-level governance. The comparison between the US and the EU 
has been conducted to support the “benign power” thesis. Although it reveals the distinct 
attitude of the EU (for instance, Berenskoetter, 2005), such comparisons are far from 
characterising the EU as an actor completely motivated with the norms.  
 
Overall, at some point, the scholarly debate turned out to be a dilemma between norms vs. 
interests (constructivist vs. rationalist accounts) and “super-power in the making” vs. futile 
international actor without means to have an impact on the international stage. The former 
refers to the debate on the nature of EUFP and the latter is more related to the impact and 
‘actorness’. How and why the EU derives its actions and motivations from norms and whose 
norms (European or universal) are taken as the basis for conflict resolution actions remains 
unexplored. As a result, there are false perceptions of the EU such as an altruistic power 
without own interests and only willing to follow norms to promote democracy and human 
rights in order to transform existing conflicts. 
 
Thus, bringing input from the field of broader peace and conflict studies is considered to be 
useful in order to assess the policy impact of the Union in Kosovo conflict resolution while 
social constructivist approach to EUFP is the main framework.  
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4 Theoretical Overview 
 
 
"The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It 
is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal 
governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world."  
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, An Agenda for Peace
 
This section serves two main purposes: first, the theoretical approach towards EUFP, and 
second, drawing upon the theoretical discussions within peace and conflict studies, the need 
for a comprehensive conflict resolution approach and its components are clarified for the case 
study.  
 
4.1 EU Foreign Policy through Social Constructivist 
Lenses  
4.1.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Rational perspectives conceptualise the nature of EU foreign policy as inherently 
intergovernmental (cf. Nuttal, 2000; Rummel, 1997). Rational choice theorists5 have come to 
the conclusion that CFSP, like every other international regime, is designed to realize 
common gains out of cooperation and it is no more than an instrument for member states to 
pursue their interests. The institutional design of CFSP and the nature of cooperation at the 
Council level have shown that the politics of scale CFSP provides, i.e. becoming influential in 
world politics, is the main drive (Regelsberger et. al, 1997). Moreover, CFSP does not only 
increase the effectiveness of foreign policy actions of member states, but also provides a clear 
framework for member states to “lock in” each other given the uncertainty of future action 
(Moravscik, 2000:226). 
 
The rationalist framework is somehow reductionist in analysing the effect of institutions on 
the member states’ behaviour. In contrast, a constructivist account provides a middle-ground 
between rationalist and reflectivist studies of the EU (Christiansen et. al, 1999). Growing 
social constructivist literature explains how constant interactions have fostered socialization 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5
 There are different factions within the rational choice framework: neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1983); 
rational choice theory (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985); rational institutional choice (Pollack, 1997, Moravscik, 
1998) and neorealism (Waltz, 1979) can be considered within this perspective. 
  11 
and convergence at the EU level in the foreign policy domain (Glarbo, 2001; Smith, 2000; 
Tonra, 1997). In other words, interests are endogenously constituted as a result of social 
exchange. The proliferation of committees and meetings and the constant exchange between 
member states create a “tendency to develop a collective ethos of their own and to generate 
trans-European perspectives on CFSP and ESDP” (Webber, et. al., 2004:17). For social 
constructivists, states’ identities and interests are part of social constructions (Wendt, 
1994:385) or in other words, ‘institutions constitute’ in the sense that “they can provide the 
agents with understandings of their interests and identities” (Checkel, 1998). Thus, contrary to 
the rationalist tendency to see structures as regulatory on behaviour as long as actors agree, 
social constructivism appreciates the gradual emergence of a common European security 
culture and that structure constitute actors’ identities and interests through the process of 
social learning and socialisation (Checkel, 1998).  
4.1.2 Norms versus Interest 
The main implication of social constructivist school of thought for EUFP literature is in terms 
of the norms versus interest debate. Constructivists conceptualise norms as collective 
understandings and constituting elements of actor’s identities and interests. Norms diffuse 
into the agents’ identities and alter their preferences. The importance of shared norms in 
(re)shaping domestic politics has been the major focus in European studies. Thus, “the 
dynamic interaction between institutional norms and political action is an aspect of the 
integration process” (Christiansen et. al, 1999:539). The body of these shared rules and norms 
include formal treaties as well as unwritten procedures, rules and behaviour. In that sense, 
what is called as the logic of appropriateness assumes that actions are norm and rule based. 
“Action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or 
role to a specific situation” (March and Olsen, 1998:9). From the perspective of 
appropriateness, foreign policy is the application of rules and norms in certain actions.  
 
On the other hand, interest focused explanations consider the rational calculations of actors. 
The logic of consequences conceptualizes the international system as being composed of 
interest maximizing actors who evaluate the likely positive or negative outcomes of actions 
(March and Olsen, 1998)6. Consequently, the international system reflects an area for 
bargaining and coalition-building between interest maximizers. Thus, the logic of 
consequences pays attention to power politics in EU external policies and also to the co-
existence of “security oriented dynamics within parameters set by norms defining the EU’s 
identity” (Youngs, 2004:415).  
 
However, the two viewpoints are not mutually exclusive. Although norms are constructed 
through social interaction, how they affect decision making is not clear (Katzenstein et. al., 
1998). Youngs states that “the way in which certain norms have been conceived and 
incorporated into external policy reveals a certain security-predicated rationalism” (Youngs, 
2004:421). The complex coexistence of the constructivist and rationalist school creates a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6
 The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences were first captured by Max Weber in his distinction 
between instrumental rationality and intrinsic rationality, which means the distinction between means/ends 
rationality and value rationality (Kaplan, 1976).  
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favourable framework in which broad instrumental choices can be made within common 
normative understandings (ibid: 431) and lead creation of “structural foreign policy”. 
4.1.3 Structural Foreign Policy 
In line with the broad reading of EUFP covering cross-pillar structures and actions, the nature 
of EUFP can be conceptualised as “structural foreign policy” which, conducted over the long-
term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and 
mental structures. It necessitates multi-level and multi-structural constitution of foreign policy 
through a formal and informal institutional set-up. Within this conceptualization, the tools of 
structural foreign policy do not contradict with conventional foreign policy, but they give a 
broadened understanding in order to be able to address the new challenges of foreign policy. 
Thus, the EU is best understood as a foreign policy actor when its role is analysed within both 
“behaviourist explanations (EU as an autonomous entity capable of formulating goals, making 
decisions, and engaging in rationalised action)” and “structuralist accounts (numerous 
context-related factors providing the rationale for the EU’s activism in the world)” 
(Papadimutriou, 2007:223).  
 
This approach can be defined as “indifferent” to the normative values vs. rational calculations 
debate since promoting norms and acting in accordance with them does not prevent the EU 
from having political concerns and political impact when dealing with conflict resolution. In 
contrast, this creates the rationale behind studying the outcomes of EU foreign policy (see 
Ginsberg, 2001, Chapter 1 for further discussion). As stated by Börzel and Risse, “[t]he 
acquisition of military capabilities and the actual use of force do not per se disconfirm a 
civilian power identity. Rather, the issue becomes in what type of political strategy military 
means are embedded, how force is used, and whether the use of force is legitimized by the 
international community (2007:5). Put it differently, the EU is not conceptualised as an 
altruistic actor but a foreign policy actor with strong commitment to values and principles and 
also capable of and willing to “shape the collective behaviour of others […] [through] 
persuasion, convincing, coercion, shaming and blaming” (Bjorkdahl, 2002:45-6). 
 
In accordance with this approach, the EU is conceptualised as an actor able to produce 
(in)effective and purposive action within the opportunities and constraints provided by the 
structures. Thus, the structure and available normative framework within which the EU 
operates when dealing with conflict resolution do not determine the outcome right away. The 
agency characteristics -the capabilities available to the EU in its dealings with conflict 
resolution, the ability to act in cohesion etc. - and the structural opportunities/constraints -the 
local conditions, presence of other international actors, the nature of the conflict in Kosovo- 
continuously shape each other and the role of the EU in conflict resolution and they define the 
outcome of this mutual relationship. This outcome is the external political impact that the EU 
creates when dealing with conflict resolution. Looking through constructivist lenses, the 
impact feeds back to the EU’s foreign policy system and shapes the structure and agency 
relationship further7. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7
 See Appendix B for demonstration of this discussion. 
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4.1.4 Capabilities and Instruments of Structural Foreign Policy: 
Europeanization and Integration as a Tool of Conflict Resolution 
From the very start, the development of EUFP and its capabilities has never been on a linear 
track. It is rather marked by leaps back and forward since the failure of EDC during the 
1950s, the “paradigm shift” (Howorth, 2004:221) on European security followed by the 
establishment of the ESDP and the development of military and civilian crisis management 
since the beginning of the 21st century8.  When we look at the institutional setting and 
historical development of EUFP, there is evidence that the capabilities-expectations gap (Hill, 
1993) has been narrowed with the latest developments of civilian and military instruments at 
the EU-level. In a short period of time, the EU has become “a major player in post-conflict 
peace-building and reconstruction efforts including robust peacekeeping” linking missions to 
“larger political stabilization and peacebuilding efforts that include the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Börzel and Risse, 2007:26). Especially when 
the Community and ESDP instruments are considered together, the EU has ‘a rich set of 
options’ to employ in its neighbourhood9. 
 
Political will of the member states still matter but according to the important lesson Europe 
has learnt from the end of the East-West geopolitical order and the emergence of intra-state 
identity wars, especially since the devastating wars in the former Yugoslavia that they should 
not ‘swim alone’ in the deep waters of foreign policy.  Considering the Western Balkans 
region, where geographic proximity is obvious, the EU is expected to have great leverage due 
to the incentive to take action against possible threats stemming from the region and greater 
cultural sensitivity (Coutts, 2002:1). As stated by Hardt, “on one hand, regional organizations 
respond to regional demands, thereby providing local legitimacy and cultural sensitivities that 
an international peace force cannot provide. On the other hand, regional organizations require 
effective partnerships with local leaders for the effects of operations to be sustainable” 
(2008:10).  
 
In line with this logic, multi-dimensional, i.e. civilian and military, conflict resolution 
instruments have been employed in the Western Balkans After more than a decade of 
engagement in the Balkans, the EU approach towards post-conflict stabilization has been 
extended to cover principles of Europeanization, namely, “regionalism, regulated 
transnational markets, and democratic constitutionalism” (Schimmelfenning, 2007:9). Börzel 
and Risse also argue that “the type of third country (accession, association, partner, “circle of 
friends”, and other third world countries)” matters, otherwise “the EU follows quite clearly a 
specific cultural script” (2007:6) in conflict resolution. Thus, the tools employed by the EU 
are multi-dimensional in all cases; the difference is the degree of commitment, effectiveness 
and consistency of the EU’s approach in non-candidate countries, which supports 
Europeanization within the conflict resolution framework in the Western Balkans. The 
Stabilization and Association Process in the Balkans -Macedonia has candidate status, as 
discussed below- is the main framework of integration as a means of conflict resolution. It has 
introduced a remarkable return within the conflict resolution logic that a ‘membership 
perspective’ provides a carrot creating a better chance of compliance with conflict resolution. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8
 See Appendix C for further discussion on EU decision-making and capabilities on conflict resolution. 
9
 Nathalie Tocci, Research Fellow, CEPS, author‘s interview, May, 2009. 
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4.2 Why is a broad theory of conflict resolution 
important? 
 
The EU is a latecomer in the field of conflict resolution. Core preoccupations of the 
international community when dealing with conflict resolution have already been highlighted 
especially after the end of the Cold War. The question what comprehensive conflict resolution 
is and how to achieve effective conflict resolution have been keeping students of 
peacebuilding and policy makers busy for a long time before the EU has engaged in the 
field10. When the initial steps of common foreign policy and conflict resolution were taken, 
the scholarly debate has generally been focused on the internal dynamics or policy 
implementation of EU practices. In other words, the studies of EUFP and conflict resolution 
are generally ‘self-oriented’ drawing upon integration theories and difficulties in realizing 
policy goals on the ground. While these concentrations are crucial in analyzing the impact of 
the EU in conflict resolution, a broader insight from peace and conflict studies is necessary in 
order to analyze the policy impact of the EU. General conflict resolution theories would 
provide a toolbox to assess the issue from a broader perspective taking the target countries 
and local concerns into account. 
 
4.3 Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Conflict 
Resolution 
What is the potential significance of comprehensive conflict resolution during the post 
conflict stage? Why does the EU need to adopt a comprehensive approach in order to 
establish a sustainable peace? In order to answer these questions, one needs to grasp the 
nature of new conflicts and the long journey of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution is not a 
linear process: there are setbacks, failures and adoptions to the initial efforts, and there exists 
no “marked milestones on a track towards a norm of peace” (Pugh, 2000: 2). This is why 
actors and approaches to conflict resolution can only be successful if the efforts are combined 
across different levels and addressed towards local needs in order to solve dilemmas. Table 
5.1 summarizes the main dilemmas for the EU and other international actors face when 
dealing with conflict resolution11. 
 
Especially after the Cold War, the conflict resolution approach has shifted to long-term, 
multi-dimensional engagement facing with these dilemmas. An overall analysis of these 
dilemmas offers firstly, the increasing identification of the aim of conflict resolution with 
long-term development goals has undermined the role of a top-down approach. Secondly, the 
need for a bottom-up approach, namely building constituencies and capacities from within the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10
 See Zartman, 2007, Chapter 1 for an overview of origins and development of peacebuilding. 
11
 There is a wide literature on conflict resolution theory and its main challenges. More detailed discussions can 
be found in Oberschall, 2007; Jeong, 2005; Sisk, 2004; Miall et. al. 2004; Pugh, 2000. 
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target society, has been recognized by third parties, especially with increased intra-state 
conflicts. Lastly, the interdependence of actors in the international system has been widely 
appreciated. Thus, the international community today accepts that a successful conflict 
resolution practice must encompass all different policy areas and must be coherent at multiple 
levels, so that the same operation can perform multiple functions simultaneously or 
sequentially (Diehl et. al. 1998).  
 
In that sense, multi-level efforts for conflict resolution as suggested by Lederach “is built on a 
conceptual framework composed of an interdependent set of perspectives and activities 
identified as structure, process, reconciliation, resources and coordination” (Lederach, 1997, 
emphasis added). This approach provides a comprehensive framework to assess the EU’s 
practice including activities at the subsystem level, which embrace “middle range actors” at 
the local level. It emphasizes “the principle of indigenous empowerment” and that “the 
conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and 
cultural resources from within a given setting”. It is a participatory process that “top-level 
bargaining bolsters the work of community-level mediators, and local level confidence 
reinforces the pressures for peace at the top” (Sisk, 2004: 260). That is the toolbox of conflict 
resolution needs to be wide enough in order to include “negotiation, mediation, facilitation, 
consultation, conciliation and communication” (Diehl et al, 1998: 36). In other words, conflict 
resolution has to embrace a dynamic relationship between third party efforts and local 
resources and commitment.  
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Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution 
 Scope 
Light footprint: “necessary 
to develop local political and 
civil capacities “to achieve a 
post- conflict equilibrium on 
its own terms, without the 
distorting effects that the 
presence of powerful external 
actors can have” (Paris and 
Sisk, 2007: 5) 
Firm international 
presence: dominant 
international presence is 
necessary to maintain 
security and implement the 
resolution framework when 
local capacities are absent. 
Duration 
Short-term: quick fix 
approach does not provide 
sustainable peace  
Long-term: continuous 
involvement by third parties 
runs the risk of growing 
resentment and hostility from 
the local population as a 
result of dependence onto 
foreign actors 
Participation 
All parties addressed: need 
to address the concerns of all 
groups none of the factions 
should be alienated for 
lasting solution. 
In favour of one party: 
better implementation to 
support most 
democratic/collaborating 
party to the conflict. 
However, if there are many 
factions on the domestic 
arena, none of them is 
representative of the 
population.  
Dependency 
Local capacity: fostering 
self-sustaining peace through 
legitimate governance based 
on the local capacities. 
Foreign involvement: 
Continuation of large scale 
aid and foreign involvement 
necessary for stable 
resolution. 
Coherence Normative values: support for universal  norms 
Actual policy: statebuilding 
on the ground might 
necessitate pragmatic 
solutions  
 
 
Table 4.1, Dilemmas of Conflict Resolution, Source: Paris and Sisk, 2007. 
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4.4 Mapping the Components of Conflict Resolution: 
Three Thematic Areas 
Based on the discussion above, this paper is based on a typology for systemic analysis of the 
EU engagement in comprehensive conflict resolution. Although the intensity and effects of 
ethno-political conflict are different in each case, a structured typology is deemed necessary 
because the ‘field reality’ of violence and its impact on the communities is similar (Nordstrom 
and Martin, 1992: 3-17). Drawing upon the wide literature on conflict resolution, the general 
classification for a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution covers three dimensions in 
this paper: political capacity building, economic development and societal change12. These 
pillars constitute the skeleton of EU conflict resolution in Kosovo together with conditioning 
factors and local capacities (see Chapter 5).  
4.4.1 Political Capacity Building 
The end of an armed conflict, which is marked by a cease-fire between the fighting groups, 
represents the beginning of a difficult process, which would last many years. Political 
capacity building at multiple levels of governance is generally the foremost aim of the 
international community at the post-conflict stage. The first aim is to fortify public security, 
prevent violent crime and return to violence; at a later stage this also includes state building, 
namely the development of state institutions working under the rule of law.  
 
The means to achieve these aims are multi dimensional. Demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration of former belligerents, maintaining order and law through security sector reform, 
drawing a constitutional framework, ensuring power sharing and free and fair elections are the 
litmus test for the success of political capacity building. This is a continuous process 
throughout the conflict resolution phase and constitutes the basis for the creation of a 
participatory strategy for conflict resolution between the locals and the international 
community (Jeong, 2005: 45).  
 
Maintaining law and order is mainly implemented through security sector reform, i.e. 
establishing police and judiciary. In the absence of a local police force and an educated 
judiciary, the international community carries out the role of police and judicial experts with 
execution capacities and training of local forces in line with international rules. International 
forces do not only enhance the capacity of the local police and the judicial system through 
advice and training, but they also assume a monitoring function.  
 
A case where a third party is involved in conflict resolution generally entails complex power 
sharing agreements at the final stage between the parties with the aim of sowing democracy at 
the institutional level. The goal of democratization is achieved when the host nation accepts 
the citizenship based on cultural rights, acknowledges the cultural diversity and adopts 
politics of recognition through power sharing. As developed by Lijphard (1977) and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
12
 See Miall et al, 2004; Pugh, 2000; Zartman, 2007, Glasius and Kostovicova, 2008, Voorhoeve, 2007, Jeong, 
2005.  
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Nordlinger (1972), power sharing theory, in principle, entails a basic principle that “two or 
more ethnic groups have to rule the common polity jointly and take decisions by consensus. 
No single group can decide important matters without the consent of the other(s)” 
(Schneckener, 2004:25). Thus, as stated by Lijphard, this is different from majority 
democracy where political elites compete with each other. It is rather defined by elite 
cooperation and joint governance at a common state level where different communities also 
enjoy self-rule to various degrees13.  Generally power-sharing agreements are accompanied 
with rights granted to the minority groups in terms of educational and cultural rights besides 
representation and self-rule.  
4.4.2 Economic Reconstruction 
The second dimension of comprehensive conflict resolution is economic reconstruction. Since 
the international community increasingly sees poverty as the root cause of conflict, it is 
natural that in the post-Cold War period, aid and politics have been united in order to provide 
a coherent policy of conflict resolution. “The present international consensus on the pressing 
need to manage conflict and transform societies on the global periphery in a liberal direction” 
is the uniting factor of aid and politics (Duffield, 2002:1051). EU conflict resolution has been 
built upon a liberal international approach14, a practice based on political capacity building in 
line with democratization, the rule of law, and economic reconstruction through 
“marketization”. As stated by Paris, “the liberal international approach to peacebuilding has 
rested on the assumption that 'the magic of the market economy and the ballot box can be 
achieved merely by changing economic policy and allowing more political participation’ 
(Paris, 1997:78).  
 
Aid is the other tool of economic reconstruction, which is able to alter the balance between 
social and political groups. Aid is used as a tool for post-war reconstruction, integration of the 
local economy into world economic structures and development of civil society (Duffiled, 
2002). When we consider that not all parties in the post-conflict stage are devoted to conflict 
resolution, “aid conditionality can [nevertheless] furnish political muscle to a peace process, 
even when dealing with the most recalcitrant of parties” (Boyce, 2002: 1027). Hence, it can 
provide great leverage to third parties in promotion of conflict resolution. On the other hand, 
there is also the risk of local dependency on foreign aid. 
 
Within the context of the Western Balkans, the conflict resolution reflected by the Union is 
one of neo-liberal restructuring through “law-governed, market-oriented liberal democracies” 
(Demetropoulou, 2002:90), a tentative promise of integration and consent of local ethno-
political groups (Turkes and Gokgoz, 2006:665). However, this assumption is criticised as 
being naive and false, particularly in the case of war-shattered states. Rather, the process of 
political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous and disruptive. “Marketization” 
is highly likely to create unequal distributions and economic hardship in the post-war society 
(ibid). 
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 See Appendix A for detailed features of power sharing systems. 
14
 Nathalie Tocci, Research Fellow, CEPS, author’s interview, May 2009; See also Turkes and Gokgoz, 2006. 
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4.4.3 Societal Transformation 
 
“Victims of violence and rape cannot just walk back into everyday life as if nothing happened. As we all know,
in the former Yugoslavia, peace has yet to break out for many of the victims. That is why psycho-social work 
deserves to be a high priority in our emergency aid programmes.”  
Emma Bonino, 1995
 
 
 
The constructions of social relationships and interests, as well as the way of how these 
interests are pursued- whether peacefully or through the use of violence- should be addressed 
in the conflict resolution process. Thus, transformation of social relations from bottom 
constitutes the third element of conflict resolution. As stated by Miall et. al., psycho-social 
aspects of conflict resolution “[are] not an optional extra or an idealistic aspiration separate 
from the other more pragmatic aspects of post-settlement peacebuilding, as it often seems to 
be. [They are] integral to every other enterprise” (2004:206). The importance of the human 
security lies at the root of this understanding. Morgan states that the human security 
perspective in conflict resolution is generally ignored because conflict resolution is viewed 
through state-centric lenses where human beings are means of conflict resolution and not the 
ends of the efforts (2005). Thus, besides establishing political capacities and economic 
development, conflict resolution activities should also focus on alleviating human suffering 
and development of human rights.  
 
Thus, societal transformation aims at replacing institutionalized hatred in society with norms 
and values of human security and peaceful coexistence. In other words, it is a means to 
eliminate the cultural sources of conflict and to deconstruct “the otherization”. 
Reconciliation, development of human rights and civil society, as well as support for free 
media activities are in the focus of societal transformation (see ‘Box 4.1’ for further 
conceptual clarification).  
 
Box 4.1 Reconciliation and Civil Society 
Reconciliation means harmonizing of divergent stories, acquiescence in a given situation (perhaps reluctantly) 
and restoration of friendly relations (Miall et. al, 2004: 209, citing from Pankhurst, 1998). Inter-communal 
workshops are most preferred way of reconciling ethnically divided societies after war by the EU. 
 
“In the context of regeneration and peacebuilding, the concept of civil society can be understood as building 
trust, cooperation, compromise, inclusion and pluralism through non-state associations of all kinds” (Pugh. 
2000: 121). It is acknowledged that civil society provides public space within which political and social 
interaction take place between not only individuals but also state and citizens. Particular attention is paid to 
NGOs, media and trade unions. However, there is the risk of rapid import of civil society from abroad without 
historical roots within the local context. The most criticised pattern of societal change is, as Pouligny states, 
those foreign NGOs appear to de facto exclude the traditional forms of arrangements existing in the society 
which would participate in “a local experiment of modernity”. They fail to find out “how ‘bridges’ between 
communities and groups are built which makes civil society building an elitist approach (Pouligny, 2004). 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 summarizes the above thematic categorization of comprehensive conflict resolution. 
 
  20 
Political Capacity Building Economic Reconstruction Societal Transformation 
Complex Power Sharing Humanitarian Aid and Relief Civil Society Development 
Elections Development Assistance Protection and Development of 
Human Rights 
Security Sector Reform Liberalization and Marketization Free Media 
Institutionalized relationship with 
the EU 
 Reconciliation  
 
 
Table 4.2 Three Thematic Areas of Conflict Resolution 
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5 Method 
5.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This study is constructed on the assumption that empirical studies are central to understand 
the phenomenon the researcher aims to analyze. In other words, it is assumed that there is a 
dynamic relationship between the theory and the empirical study used for the research. This 
relationship is two-fold: first, the study, based on observations, is placed within the theoretical 
framework adopted; and second, based on the empirical material, the researcher can either 
alter the theory (theory development) or validate the theory through generalizations and/or 
confirming previous research (theory testing).  
 
Within this framework, the study aims at addressing two key research questions:  
• To what extent/how do EU structures and capabilities provide opportunities and/or 
constraints for comprehensive conflict resolution? (analysis of multiple EU mechanisms 
and institutions for comprehensive conflict resolution policies and actions- explanatory 
approach), 
 
• Relying on the first question as a broader framework, what is the policy impact of the EU 
in Kosovo conflict resolution as a case study and how is this impact shaped given the 
structures and capabilities available to the EU? (case study- exploratory approach) 
 
Drawing upon the work by Doyle and Sambanis (2000), the study develops its own 
structural/thematic framework to answer these questions. Doyle and Sambanis state that 
violent conflicts share three parameters: “a political environment in which success in 
achieving peace depends on the degree of harm sustained, the resources available for 
development, and the international assistance to overcome gaps” (2000:780). Based on these 
broad parameters, this study discusses EU conflict resolution across the three areas of EU 
involvement with different instruments (referred as comprehensive conflict resolution across 
three issue areas of political capacity building, economic reconstruction and societal 
transformation, see Chapter 3), conflict conditioning factors and the developed local capacity 
as the three aspects affecting the impact of EU in conflict resolution area. These three 
parameters are interconnected and therefore shape each other (Figure 5.1). 
  
The policy impact15 of the EU in conflict resolution is defined as the area of the triangle. This 
paper hypothesizes that comprehensive conflict resolution, conditioning factors of conflict, 
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 As stated by Ginsberg, “a focus on external political effects of EFP activity broadly defined- rather than on the 
“successes” and “failures” of the CFSP (designed to produce certain kinds of actions but not all EFP actions)- 
avoids judgement calls and makes more concrete what we know of the EU’s effects internationally.” (Ginsberg, 
2001:5). That is why the author prefers using “policy impact” rather than success of the EU in conflict 
resolution. 
  22 
and the level of local capacities developed are interrelated factors generating the policy 
impact of the EU. 
 
 
Local capacities 
(developed through EU engagement in conflict resolution) 
    
 
 
 
 
Context Conflict Resolution 
(three thematic issue areas) 
(Local and international context) 
EU Policy Impact 
 
Figure 5.1 Structure of Hypothesis 
5.2 Research Design 
In order to answer the research questions, the study employs a qualitative study towards the 
EU’s role through conducting a theoretically informed, empirically rich case study method as 
the research design. Case study method is useful since it “allows the researcher to study a 
phenomenon intensively, interpret how theoretical elements are related to each other and 
thereby arrive at a better understanding of complex problems and dynamic process” 
(Bjorkdahl, 2002:32). Case study method is not only about hypothesis testing or “logic of 
confirmation”, but also related to the “logic of discovery”, namely the formation of new 
hypothesis and theory development (George and Bennett, 2005) (For a further discussion on 
case study method see Box 5.1).  
 
Box 5.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Case Study 
Conflict resolution, state building, social transformation are difficult concepts to measure and their meanings 
may vary in different contexts. Case study methodology is mostly appropriate in cases when the phenomenon 
under study is not readily distinguishable from its context. Case study research is of advantage when the aim is 
to define topics broadly, to cover not only the phenomenon of study but also contextual conditions, and finally 
to rely on multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1993). These three conditions are present in this study. However, 
because of the plethora of new possible explanations of a case or degrees of freedom problem, the researcher 
may tend to ignore other causal paths leading to the same outcome. Moreover, the aim and nature of case study 
method necessitates keeping the number of cases small. However, when the sample is small the 
representativeness of the cases for broader generalizations is decreased. Given the unique features of each 
conflict generalizability of case studies in conflict resolution field is low.  
 
 
Process tracing is useful in case study research design since it allows the researcher to analyze 
the phenomenon in an evolutionary process by focusing on history, organizational and 
procedural behavior, discourses, actors, structures, and change of these over time. “In process-
tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts to see 
whether the causal process a theory hypotheses or implies in a case is in fact evident in the 
sequence and values of the intervening variables on that case.” (George and Bennett, 2005:6-
7). Thus, the complex causality of the broad role the EU plays with multiple instruments in 
conflict resolution in Kosovo can be revealed by process tracing. 
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The case study on Kosovo consists of two main parts within the framework of this study. It 
starts with a contextual analysis, namely initial mapping and identification of the nature of the 
conflict. This includes a brief history, causes of the conflict and up to date efforts of third 
parties in the conflict resolution. This part will allow the author to extract the EU’s role in the 
process. The main part of the case study on Kosovo will single out the EU as an actor (See 
Box 5.2) of conflict resolution.  
 
 
Box 5.2 Unit of Analysis 
Yin emphasizes the importance of defining the unit of analysis (1993:10). This allows the researcher to draw the 
boundaries of the study and construct the research within feasible limits. Here, the proposed unit of analysis is 
the EU. Although the researcher is well aware of the sub-units and divisions within the EU, the role of the EU in 
conflict resolution in Kosovo will be assessed in total without considering the divergent positions of some of the 
member states. The common focus will be the active role of the EU in resolving the conflict. 
The reason for this approach is two-fold: first, analyzing the EU and position of its sub-units in one research is
not feasible. Secondly, the engagement of the EU in conflict resolution is understood in broad terms. The issue 
is placed within the context of European Foreign Policy, which is the policy of all EU external activities across 
three pillars -the sum of ‘member states’ foreign policy’, ‘EU foreign policy’ and ‘EC foreign policy’ (White, 
2001:39). The conflict resolution activities that the EU undertakes are also conceptualized in broad ‘European 
Foreign Policy’ in order to “encompass the fragmented nature of agency at the European level and the variety of 
forms of action” (White, 2001: 39, also see the section on EU Foreign Policy ). It is also reflected in the broad 
thematic areas (See section ‘Mapping the Components of Conflict Resolution: three thematic areas’) political 
capacity building, economic reconstruction and societal change), which have implications for first and second 
pillars of the Union.  
 
 
 
The analysis will be conducted using the three thematic issue areas of political capacity 
building, economic reconstruction and societal transformation. The preference for these 
thematic areas reflects the general approach in comprehensive conflict resolution theory. 
These issues can overlap and act across broad thematic areas. However, for the purpose of a 
systemic analysis of multi-level EU engagements in conflict resolution, the three areas are 
assessed separately. In order to analyze the role of the EU in conflict resolution, the study 
makes a short comparison with Macedonia and Kosovo with the aim of highlighting the 
impact of the EU more precisely, which would not be possible with a single case study (See 
Box 5.3). The analysis chapter discusses the capacities, vulnerabilities and empowerment 
needs of the EU, i.e. policy impact. 
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Box 5.3 Case Selection Criteria 
The criteria defined by Yin provide the roadmap for selection of the cases (Yin, 2003:34): 
(i) The case is critical for the hypotheses or theories being tested; 
(ii) The case offers rich opportunities for improving understanding of the primary phenomena or processes 
under research; 
(iii) The case has a topical relevance; and 
(iv)The case is feasible and accessible. 
The Western Balkans has always been the primary focus and the main stimuli for further development of 
instruments of EU conflict resolution since the break-up of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is chosen as the main case study 
among the alternatives in the region because it represents long term active involvement by the EU with multiple 
instruments in conflict resolution area with long term institutional arrangements in the post-conflict setting 
besides substantial international involvement (Bieber, 2004:2). Moreover, there is much reliable theoretical and 
empirical work conducted on Kosovo and Macedonia conflicts. 
Although, this study will not conduct a strict comparative analysis between Kosovo and Macedonia, the latter 
has been the first in many respects regarding conflict resolution engagement; thus provides a reference point to 
analyze the development of EU in conflict resolution field. First, it was the first time CFSP tools were used for 
mediating the parties (Piana, 2002). Secondly, NATO and EU worked together at practical level and NATO 
handed over military operation to the EU Concordia, the first ESDP mission implementing Berlin Plus 
Agreements (Eldridge, 2002). Hence, the comparison will clarify the policy impact of the EU and reveal 
opportunities and constraints of EU as an actor of conflict resolution. 
 
5.3 Data Collection 
The analysis will rely on the collection of as many sources as possible related to the case 
study through secondary sources, namely the main academic literature. Textual analysis of 
briefs, policy papers and documents of EU bodies on Kosovo (when necessary Macedonia as 
well) reveal the EU’s position, role and strategies in these conflicts and help detecting the 
causes of particular behavior and impact within the comprehensive conflict resolution 
framework.  
 
Semi structured expert interviews (see Box 5.4) are also considered to be crucial for the 
further analysis of the situation and for the discovery of new features of policy impact on the 
ground. 
 
Box 5.4 Semi-Structured Expert Interviews 
• Bekim Sejdiu, Charge d’Affairs Kosovo to Ankara (interview conducted on March, 13, 2009, Embassy 
of Kosovo, Ankara, Turkey); 
• Guner Ureya, Deputy Head of Mission to Ankara (interview conducted on March, 13, 2009, Embassy 
of Kosovo, Ankara, Turkey); 
• Anna Jarstad, Dr., Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies (interview conducted 
on April, 22, 2009); 
• Nathalie Tocci, Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (interview conducted on 
May, 5, 2009). 
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5.4 Awaiting Challenges 
Conflict resolution is a complex task that needs long-term, multi level engagement 
comprising several challenges for researchers in this area. There is no linear process with 
clear start and finish. The researcher generally does not work on a completed event and with 
given material but has to react to new developments and refine the research design and 
questions during the course of the research. Thus, measuring the overall success is hardly 
possible during the dynamic process of conflict resolution.  
 
A second challenge is the presence of many stakeholders, which obstructs the task of focusing 
on the role of only one actor of conflict resolution (the EU in this study). Actors operate in 
cross cutting issue areas, in collaboration or contradiction with each other, and each action has 
implications for another area. The role of the other actors of conflict resolution such as 
NATO, the US, the UN and other international organizations is briefly mentioned when 
necessary. 
 
Thirdly, the EU is considered to be a unitary actor in this study for the purpose and feasibility 
of conducting a study on conflict resolution. However, the researcher is very well aware of 
the internal divisions and incoherence inherent in the EU policy-making process. Most of the 
member states have their own bilateral relationships with and agendas in Kosovo. However, 
the aim is to focus on the overall contribution of the EU in Kosovo. The conflicting agenda 
and priorities of the first and second pillar are mentioned in the conclusion part when the 
overall impact of the EU is assessed. 
 
Lastly, the absence of interviews and data collection on the ground due to the lack of 
resources and limited time frame required to complete the study is an impediment for a full-
fledged analysis since the lack of field study data may obstruct the understanding of the actual 
local context. The study aims at compensating this gap with the consideration of previous 
case studies from secondary sources and with data collected from news on Kosovo. 
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6 Kosovo: Supporting a Borderland... 
 
“The international community should reward Kosovars for their patience in seeking self-determination, and 
their use of force only as a last resort, by allowing them, in pursuance with international law, to secede from 
their long-time oppressor and obtain the status of a fully independent country.”  
 
Korab R. Sejdiu, ‘The Revival of a Forgotten Dispute: Deciding Kosova’s Future’
“…nothing is more critical for the Serb people than the present struggle in Kosovo and for Kosovo…Kosovo is 
the most precious of Serb words. It has been paid for with the blood of the whole nation. Because of that price it 
is entrenched at the throne of the Serb language. Without blood it could not be bought, without blood it cannot 
be sold”  
Matiya Bechkovich, Serb Poet, 1989 -cited in Trbovich, 2009.
 
6.1 Historical Background: a region of conflict par 
excellence 
Kosovo has a complex history since the times of the Yugoslav Federal state. It has been a 
province of Serbia for most of the 20th century16. It is mostly inhabited by ethnic Albanians 
and borders Albania and Macedonia, where their fellows enjoy wide minority rights. After 
Tito’s death, ethnic tensions began to rise throughout Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, the Albanian 
majority demanded being recognised as a republic. The protests often escalated into violence 
followed by repression. Subsequently, all autonomy enjoyed by Kosovo was removed by the 
Yugoslav federal state. In 1991, Kosovo Albanians held a referendum and voted for 
independence, which was never recognised at the federal level17. Throughout the 1990s, the 
process of alienation between the two communities of Albanians and Serbs led to the 
culmination of hostilities and violent ethnic conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and the Serbian forces, which were ended by the NATO air campaign in 199918. The 
air campaign forced the Yugoslav forces under Milosevic to withdraw from the Kosovo 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16
 Although Kosovo was a province of Serbia during communist rule, the Yugoslav constitutions of 1946, 1953 
and 1963 provided it with the status of an “autonomous province”. Under the Yugoslav hierarchical system of 
governance, autonomous provinces enjoyed limited self-government. The 1974 Constitution gave Kosovo even 
further rights and the de facto status of a Republic except the right of secession.  
17
 During this period, the region witnessed a huge exodus of Serb and Montenegrin populations and therefore 
became more Albanian dominated in terms of ethnic population. 
18
 To provide a complete historical background on the issue is beyond the scope of this study. For a complete 
historical narrative of the Balkans since World War II see Crampton, 2004; for the situation in Kosovo until the  
1999 NATO intervention see Troebest, 1999; Malcolm, 1998; for a complete review of international efforts until 
1999 see Weller, 2008. 
  27 
province and Kosovo was put under international trusteeship by UN Security Council 
(UNSC) Regulation 1244 (see. Box 6.1 for detailed discussion of parties to the conflict).  
 
Box 6.1 Conflict Parties and Issues 
The main parties to the conflict are Serbia, Kosovo Albanian majority and Serb minority. The asymmetrical 
relationship between Serbia and Kosovo during 1990s was turned upside down with the NATO air campaign. 
After the establishment of international administration on the Kosovo’s territory, Serbia lost all de facto
authority in the region. However, the values attributed to Kosovo territory have continued on the both sides of 
the conflict. While Kosovar Albanians see Kosovo as the motherland for centuries, Serbia has emphasised 
historical ties with Kosovo territory. The territory of Kosovo is seen as the heart of Serbia with special 
importance for Serbian Orthodox church since the Middle Ages. This argument was mostly exploited during 
Milosevic era in order to mobilize Serbs in favour of violence against Albanians.   
While Serbia emphasized the primacy of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal self-
determination (highest degree of autonomy but not independence), Kosovo argues they have right to self-
determination after years of oppression and violence. As a result, the different point of views of the parties to the 
conflict prevented any sustainable settlement on final status. 
From the very outset, the international community has polarised between the two parties mirroring the ethnic 
polarization within Kosovo, while Western world has been condemning and taking action against Serbian 
aggression, Russia has supported Serbia, which creates the main obstacle to solve the issue under UNSC 
auspices. Russia clearly expressed recognition of Kosovo’s independence would alter order in other parts of the 
world, which was realised with the Russia’s unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and S. Ossetia as independent 
states claiming that two separatist claims have the similar situation to Kosovo. 
The membership aspirations of Serbia into the EU and its pro-European government since May 2008 elections 
have changed Serbia’s position to moderate and cooperative with the EU on the ground, however, it did not 
prevent Serbia to look for support from international community.  
 
 
While de facto placing the whole responsibility of governance under an international interim 
administration, Kosovo remained a part of Federal Yugoslavia and the decision on the final 
status was delayed until undetermined future talks have taken place19. Resolution 1244 
established a complex governance structure under the authority of the UN Special 
Representative of Secretary General (SRSG) who retained the full authority and final 
decision-making power (see Box 6.2 and 6.3 for Structure/Competences of UNMIK, KFOR 
and Provisional Government). The international administration in Kosovo is considered to be 
unique compared to peacebuilding missions launched in the aftermath of the Cold War in 
terms of the broad mandate of the civilian and military components and the degree of 
involvement of regional organizations such as OSCE and EU20. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19
 UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 11. 
20
 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
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Box 6.2 Structure/Competences of UNMIK and KFOR  
The complex system established by the Resolution known as United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is 
composed of four pillars. Headed by the SRSG, first pillar was police and justice mission under direct leadership 
of UN which incorporates international police force and developing local Kosovo Police Service (KPS); the 
second pillar was civil administration under UN including ministerial and municipal bureaucracy; third was 
democratization and institution building supervised by OSCE and the last pillar was under direct EU control and 
dealt with reconstruction and economic development (UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 of 15 May 2001). Besides 
civilian administration under the UN, NATO became responsible for security of Kosovo through military 
presence called KFOR. Its mandate is more precise compared to UNMIK: “deterrence of new hostilities, 
maintenance and, if necessary, enforcement of ceasefire, verification of withdrawal of all FRY troops, 
demilitarization of KLA, establishment of a secure environment for refugee return and the operation of UNMIK, 
as well as the provision of public safety” (Alfons, 2008: 342). 
 
 
The whole structure is composed as a complex set of institutional design and gave birth to a 
quasi-independent state without final status. Published in 2003, “Standards for Kosovo”21 
included the establishment of “effective and functioning democratic institutions, enforcement 
of the rule of law, freedom of movement, returns, basis for a sound market economy, clarity 
in property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the transformation of Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS)”  (Alfons, 2006:348)22. The UNMIK declaration was followed by the Kosovo 
Standards Implementation Plan developed by UMNIK and the Provisional Self-Governance 
in Kosovo (PISG) in 2004. However, much of the areas defined under standards were not 
under control of PISG and the implementation was dependent on the international 
community’s performance on the ground, since PISG had neither competence nor capabilities 
to implement them. Moreover, the standards were not directly linked to independence but 
only to the opening of status negotiations, thus falling short of proper incentives for the 
implementation by Kosovo authorities23.  
 
In late 2005, the UNSC initiated a process for the political settlement of the issue and 
appointed a special envoy for future status talks. Marti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, 
was appointed to the post. After establishing a shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and 
Pristina, Ahtisaari submitted a comprehensive plan for the future of Kosovo in 200724. It 
foresees a supervised independence for Kosovo, but never mentions the word ‘independence’, 
rather refers to Kosovo as a “multiethnic society, which shall govern itself democratically, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
21
 Standards for Kosovo, 2003, UNMIK, Standards were agreed between the Kosovo provisional institutions of 
self-government and UNMIK, and were approved by the United Nations Security Council. The Standards for 
Kosovo are a set of targets that Kosovo must meet in order for the talks about the future political status of 
Kosovo to begin. Standards were agreed between the Kosovo provisional institutions of self-government and 
UNMIK, and were approved by the United Nations Security Council. The Standards for Kosovo are a set of 
targets that Kosovo must meet in order for the talks about the future political status of Kosovo to begin.See 
http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/ for further information. 
22
 UNMIK/PR/1078, Standards for Kosovo, 10 December 2003. 
23
 “Standards for Kosovo” was criticised in many ways. Stated by the Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, Kai 
Eide, more concrete efforts were needed for status settlement, which would run in parallel with standards 
implementation (Eide, 2005). 
24
 The plan was based on the previous guiding principles agreed by the Contact Group; namely France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK, the US and Russia. These principles were no return to the pre-1999 period, no partition 
of Kosovo and no redrawing of international borders in the region. See NATO Parliamentary Assembly 
Committee Report No. 163 CDS 07 E rev 2.  
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and with full respect for the rule of law, through its legislative, executive and judicial 
institutions”.25  
 
Box 6.3 Provisional Government 
While the four pillar structure of UNMIK and KFOR established international presence widely, Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government issued in 2001created a system of “Provisional Self-Government 
in Kosovo (PISG)” ,which was the local part of Kosovo governance operating under UNMIK supervision. The 
competencies under four pillars were agreed to be gradually transferred to PISG (UNMIK Regulation No. 
2001/9 on ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self- Government in Kosovo’). Central authority of 
Kosovo has given competencies in wide range of issue areas including external affairs under the authority of 
SRSG since 2001. These include “economic, financial and budgetary policy; customs; trade, industry, and 
investment; education, science, and technology; youth, sport, and culture; health and family policy; agriculture; 
environment; tourism; labour; social welfare; transport; media; communication; statistics; spatial planning; good
governance; non-resident affairs; local administration; and judicial affairs” (Wollf, 2008: 424). However, 
UNMIK Regulation No/ 2001/9 has defined a list of sensitive areas where UNMIK had reserved powers. These 
include “human and minority rights, monetary policy, appointment and removal of judges and prosecutors, 
external representation and the conclusion of international agreement on behalf of Kosovo, control over Kosovo 
Protection Corps (KPC), and several other policy areas” (Alfons, 2006: 342). 
 
 
Serbia and Russia rejected the plan and insisted that any settlement of the status should be 
drawn under a new UNSC Resolution, while the international community continued its 
support for the Ahtisaari Plan. During the deadlock, in August 2007, the UN Special 
Representative (UNSR) initiated Troika negotiations between the EU, US and Russia starting 
a second cycle of negotiations. However, the new negotiations removed the settlement of the 
issue from the UN framework (Caruso, 2008:6). Meanwhile, the international community and 
especially the EU continuously stated that the PISG has completed its mandate and the 
ongoing status of Kosovo was unsustainable26. Kosovo restated its acceptance of the Ahtisaari 
Plan and seemed already on its way for independence. Elections were held in November 2007 
while the Troika was still working. In December 2007 the Troika negotiations concluded with 
no success since the parties were not able to reach an agreement.  
 
On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence and stated its commitment to the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan.27 The European Council declared Kosovo as a sui 
generis case and placed support for continued international presence and deployment of the 
rule of law mission28. KFOR and UNMIK declared their continuing presence in Kosovo on 
the basis of UNSC Resolution 1244.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
25
 The main framework foreseen in the Athisaari Plan comprises the creation of a constitution, state symbols, 
security forces, and membership of international community. After a 120-day transition period, the whole 
mandate of UNMIK is to be transferred to local governance. The plan also establishes a continued international 
mandate through ICO and ICR, a post to be fulfilled by the EUSR. The Ahtisaari Plan also introduces wide 
minority rights for the Serb community in terms of governance, education, healthcare and cultural and religious 
rights. See, UN Doc, S/2007/168 Add. 1, para.1. 
26
 See EC Communication from the Commission to the Council and the EP, Brussels, Doc. COM. (2007) 663. 6 
November 2006. 
27
 The international community reacted differently to the declaration. While Russia and Serbia clearly stated it 
was illegal and against Resolution 1244, the US recognised the new state right away. On the EU side, the 
member states did not reach an agreement on recognition. 
28
 The European Commission’s 2006 Kosovo Progress Report states that “Kosovo’s status question is sui 
generis, and hence sets no precedent” (emphasis added). This was repeated by Ahtisaari in his special report to 
the UNSC in 2007.  
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The 120-day period ended with the coming into force of a new constitution and 41 key laws 
for Kosovo. However, without an agreement on independence, the UNMIK did not transfer its 
authority to the EU, the ICO did not take the leading responsibility and the EU Rule of Law 
Mission (EULEX) was not deployed in a timely fashion. During this period, the division 
between the two communities widened further with northern Kosovo -mainly composed of 
Serbs- rather hostile towards EULEX and ICO. At the end of the 120-day transition, UNSG 
Ban Ki-Moon proposed a reconfiguration of UNMIK and a second 120-day transition period 
began. A new SRSG was appointed with renewed responsibilities in the negotiations with 
Kosovo Serbs29. The aim of the reconfiguration plan is that “by the end of November [2008], 
UNMIK should be significantly downscaled and EULEX deployed throughout Kosovo” (ICG 
Report, 2008:2).  
 
For the time being, the Kosovo state apparatus has been established and works under close 
supervision of the EU as well as economic and other civilian establishments. EULEX is fully 
deployed including northern Kosovo (see map of Kosovo, north of Ibar River where the 
majority of Serbs live). While UNMIK and other international organizations remain on the 
ground, they suffer from a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ due to the “majority Kosovar Albanians’ 
disappointment with UNMIK’s failure to provide for stability and economic development in a 
long run” (Hasani, 2008:24). Although with the latest elections in Serbia, a pro-EU 
government was elected, the Serbian government has taken the Kosovo issue to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an opinion on the legal dimension of the unilateral 
declaration of independence. 
6.2 EU on the Ground 
“This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions, but on values. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts 
and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure. We are witnessing the 
beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of 
mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end, values and interests 
merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society 
then that is in our national interests too.”  
Tony Blair, 1999, Speech held in Chicago ‘Doctrine of the International Community
 
The relative inability to respond to the previous crises in the former Yugoslav era and the 
possible destabilizing effects of the Kosovo conflict for the whole region has alerted the EU 
and therefore it has been engaged in the Kosovo conflict from the start. Since the 
establishment of the international presence in Kosovo, the EU assumed the responsibility of 
recovery and economic development under UNMIK Pillar IV. It has been in charge of 
customs, banking and privatization through administering the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA). 
Besides UNMIK involvement, the EU has developed an extensive presence in Kosovo30. It 
still provides the most aid and is the mostly engaged actor in state building through advising, 
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 The six areas of negotiations were subject to direct talks between UNSR Zannier and Kosovo Serbs: police, 
courts, customs, boundaries, Serbian patrimony, transportation and infrastructure. See Report of the SG on the 
UNMIK /2008/354, 12 June 2008. 
30
 See Appendix D for a discussion of EU bodies’ mandates in the Kosovo conflict resolution so far.  
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training, and monitoring since the declaration of independence. The EU’s contribution to the 
whole process is firmly stated by Sejdiu as “every step we have undertaken, every progress 
we have made has a stamp of EU’s contribution”31. Its role can best be defined as state 
building (Papadimitriou, 2007:207). The activities are dispersed across the first and second 
pillars of the Union and the role of the EU as an actor in conflict resolution continuously 
evolves further.  
 
The Declaration of Independence was a turning point for EU involvement in Kosovo. 
Authorities signalled that any settlement acceptable to Kosovo would assume the EU as the 
key actor on the ground. In December 2007, the European Council agreed to launch a rule of 
law mission to Kosovo (EULEX). As stated in the Ahtisaari Plan, the EU also appointed a 
Special Representative (EUSR), Pieter Feith, who would also be the head of the ICO32. 
 
Following the independence of Kosovo, the EU has deployed its ever biggest ESDP mission. 
The Ahtisaari Plan was designed to work under international consent, which would provide 
the ground for a gradual transformation of power to the EU and local authorities. However, 
the plan has never gained recognition in the UNSC; the requirements of the transition period 
were not fulfilled and have not yet resulted in the creation of a Kosovo state capable of self-
rule. There are also still many obstacles on the ground for the EU since it is engaged in a state 
building process of a state, which is not recognized by the whole international community33.  
 
6.3 Assessing the Impact of the EU 
“For years, European economic and political success was unmatched by our ability to project a common 
foreign policy. We talked a lot. We issued handwringing declarations. (...) But only with the Balkan crisis have 
we begun to engage directly in conflict prevention and crisis management.” 
 
Chris Patten, 1999, Speech at the Conference ‘The Development of a Common European Security and Defence 
Policy – The Integration of the New Decade’
 
 
6.3.1 Political Capacity Building 
Only after one year of independence the Republic of Kosovo was able to establish 
institutional structures necessary for running a state with huge support especially from the 
EU. However, the main question is to what extent Kosovo has become a state comprising 
effective political capacities and what role the EU has played and still plays in this process of 
political capacity building. Overall, the EU seemed united before the unilateral declaration of 
independence. In February 2008, just before the independence, all EU members decided to 
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 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
32
 EU Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 4 February, 2008. 
33
 The EU legalizes its presence through a broad reading of UNSCR 1244 and the request from Kosovo 
authorities. 
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take a leading role in Kosovo in order to implement the Ahtisaari Plan and despatch a rule of 
law mission. When Kosovo declared independence, the consensus within the EU disappeared 
regarding the recognition and the conduct of relations with the ‘Kosovo state’.34   
 
6.3.1.1 Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Rule of Law Mission 
 
The EU presence regarding SSR in Kosovo is mainly orchestrated by EULEX. The approach 
of the EU towards SSR is a holistic one embracing short and long-term activities in 
accordance with the ownership principle (Dagand, 2008). However, given the challenging 
context of Kosovo and the EU’s ‘embryonic capacities’ for SSR, the real success of the EU is 
defined by its implementation capacity (ibid).  
 
EULEX was deployed at the end of 2008 with almost one year of delay35. Although it has not 
reached its full operational capability yet, EULEX succeeded in deploying the mission in the 
entire country, which has started to produce positive effects in the problematic area of 
Mitrovica36. The EU focuses on measuring the success of EULEX as much as possible. As 
stated by Maquire: 
 
“A small team of international and local experts (working in the ‘Programme Office’) has designed a system to 
assess the impact of EULEX’s work on the ground. EULEX staff, who are co-located with their local 
counterparts, will be asked a series of specific questions every month about developments in their specialist 
fields. Over time, they will build up a picture of changes within the local police, judicial and customs systems 
which will allow EULEX to accurately report the progress of Kosovo’s Rule of Law institutions. These results 
will then be measured against the strategic objectives agreed by EU member states” (2008:16-7).   
However, problems linger on the ground. Firstly, although, all member states declared that 
they would contribute to EULEX in Kosovo, it took a long time for EULEX to deploy and 
become fully operational. Secondly, Serbia and Kosovo Serbs simply refuse to cooperate with 
EULEX. Due to the opposition of Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo, the first months of 
independence proved difficult for the deployment north of Ibar. Although later the EU has 
convinced Serbs to deploy also in the Serb area, both parties to the conflict continue to 
perceive EULEX in different terms. While Kosovo authorities see EULEX as a third party 
supervising and enhancing independence and the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, Serbs 
maintain their position to see EULEX under the UNMIK umbrella with a status (Thomsen, 
2009:6). However, the undefined status of UNMIK and other international actors necessitated 
reconfiguration of UNMIK’s role37. The UNSC initiated a reconfiguration process in order to 
clarify the renewed role of the EU. However, Pristina was not involved in the discussions 
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 Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Cyprus have not recognised the independence, being concerned with 
domestic quarrels for similar secession claims.  
35
 The mandate of EULEX is defined as to “assist the Kosovo authorities, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability”. Its activities mainly focus on 
three areas: policing, judicial system and customs service.  The police and customs have the task of mentoring 
and advising but rarely implementing. On the other hand, the judicial system is directly involved in decision 
making as well as training national judges and lawyers.  
36
 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
37
 The different opinions simply resulted from the difference in opinions on Kosovo’s status and on the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. Kosovo authorities and the Albanian population accepted the Ahtisaari 
proposal as the starting point for the new state and embedded it into the new constitution, while Serbia and the 
Serb population rejected the plan and stated the only legitimate international presence is UNMIK and any change 
should take place under a new UNSC Resolution.  
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regarding the reconfiguration of UNMIK, which, from a sovereignty point of view, restricts 
Kosovo’s full authority.  
 
Thirdly, Kosovo Albanians conceive their constitution and the EU as the ultimate reference 
points in political capacity building. Kosovo opposes putting EULEX under status neutral. 
Also, there is still confusion regarding the impact of EULEX. Its mandate and place of 
deployment remain ambiguous for Kosovars. The reason is that the EU decided the scope of 
the rule of law mission unilaterally but once established, the interpretation of the mandate has 
been disputed -being neutral under an UN umbrella versus supporting Kosovo’s government 
in establishing a state police and a judicial system.38 In practice, the EU is neither a neural 
actor between Serbia and Kosovo nor assumes political leadership as stated in the Joint 
Action Plan.  
 
Fourthly, the development of Kosovo police and judicial system has not taken off since 
Serbian municipalities established their own parallel institutions financed by Belgrade. The 
Serbian contributors are not satisfied with the security institutions and they refuse to serve 
under the Kosovo Police Force (KPS) and Protection Corps (KPC) after the declaration of 
independence as can be seen in ‘Graph 6.1’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6.1 
UNDP Early Warning Report, 2008, ‘Satisfaction with Security Institutions- Kosovo Serb Responses’.  
 
The rule of law mission remains more fragile than the police mission. The challenge of the 
absence of local trained lawyers and a legal body of law necessitate international judges to 
take over those functions. However, the applicable laws are divided between former Yugoslav 
laws and UNMIK regulations and laws, given that the state of Kosovo is still in the course of 
legislating laws based on the new constitution.  Moreover, international judges are not aware 
of the local norms when they make decisions, which create further ambiguities for judges 
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 According to the Joint Action Plan the head of EULEX receives orders from the EU’s PSC and Javier Solana. 
However, Belgrade and the UN Secretary General see the EULEX mission as status-neutral under UNSCR 1244. 
EULEX, like the OSCE, will operate under a UN mandate (Deimel and Schmidt, 2009). 
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regarding which law applies (Schmidt, 2008:36). Moreover, there are around 50,000 cases 
awaiting decision (OSCE Report, 2008).  
 
Although the court system is considered by Sejdiu to be “based on the highest democratic 
standards”, which is “developed under the close scrutiny of the EU” and although EU 
standards highlight the ongoing legislative process39, the courts continue to be the least 
satisfying institution in Kosovo according to the UNDP (Graph 6.2).  
 
 
Graph 6.2 
 UNDP Early Warning Report, 2008, ‘Satisfaction with Kosovo’s Main Institutions’. 
 
Considered together, coordination problems and context related problems affect the impact of 
the EULEX mission (see also Graph 6.3, demonstrating the low trust of the Kosovo people in 
the mission).  
 
6.3.1.2 ICO/ICR: EU Mission without Real Impact 
 
The Ahtisaari Plan has foreseen the creation of the International Civilian Office (ICO) and the 
International Civilian Representative (ICR) for a unified international engagement in Kosovo 
under supervised independence. Its task is to monitor and supervise the implementation of the 
Plan. Due to the failure to convince all parties on the Comprehensive Plan, the authority of 
UNMIK was not transferred to ICO/ICR after the declaration of independence. Thus, 
ICO/ICR was only recognised by the states which recognised the independence. EUSR Pieter 
Feith assumed the responsibility of ICR making the dual functions of ICR and EUSR to cause 
difficulties on the ground because of the incompatibility of those roles. Deimel and Schmidt 
describe this confusion: 
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 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
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“Whereas the ICR is supposed to supervise the government of the Republic of Kosovo, opinions differ with 
regard to the function of the EUSR in the 22 pro-recognition and 5 anti-recognition states. Basically conceived 
as no more than a way of coordinating EU activities in Kosovo, the EUSR function is becoming more and more 
important, and makes it necessary to walk a never-ending tightrope. It is supposed to promote the consistency of 
EU activities and as to advise and support the political process. However, some openly aired disagreements 
between ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith and Pierre Mirel of the European Commission concerning the leadership and 
steering function of EULEX shed a revealing light on the imperfection of the coordinating processes within the 
EU, and make the tensions implicit in the confused and impenetrable system plain for all to see.” (2009:5). 
 
Moreover, the local population is unaware of the role of ICO/ICR. Also, the impact of 
ICO/ICR depends on the willingness of Kosovo institutions to cooperate.   
 
6.3.1.3 Power Sharing/Decentralization and Elections 
 
The whole public authority can be described by three vertical layers 40 after 1999. From the 
very start, the presence of the international community has been complex and inclusive of 
local structures as understood from complex system of governance. The power sharing and 
the extensive rights for minorities foreseen by the Ahtisaari Plan were incorporated into the 
Kosovo Constitution. The constitution gives extensive rights to minorities and defines wide 
competences for local governance41. Weller states that although “Kosovo was concerned that 
such an approach would entrench ethnic division and a system of ethnic politics, rather than 
providing opportunities for interest based politics to develop across politics” (2008:673), the 
EU firmly stated that its support in conflict resolution would depend on the commitment to 
extensive minority rights and power sharing. Kosovo made concessions on the basis of the 
leverage enjoyed by the EU and the US and in return it would gain a final independent status 
and would be integrated within Europe (Weller, 2008). The implementation of the 
constitutional structure regarding decentralization of the Kosovo state has not been realised 
yet since the Serbian minority has so far not recognised the authority of the Kosovo state. 
 
Elections and electoral system are also far from fully being developed. Five elections rounds 
have been conducted at the national legislative and the local levels since 199942, which have 
been evaluated democratic and free compared to other examples in the region43, mostly due to 
the presence of international monitoring. However, the party structure still remains fragile for 
a democratic state. Although all Albanian parties and other minorities except Serbs supported 
independence, they are far from offering concrete programs on the future political and 
economic development. The Serb minority generally boycotts the elections and runs parallel 
elections for municipal bodies44. This situation has prevented the international community 
from establishing an effective power sharing agreement within the country.  
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 See Appendix E for layers of governance and power sharing among the layers established since the UN 
mandate. 
41
 See Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter X. 
42
 In terms of state structure Kosovo is divided between the region north of the Ibar River and the southern 
territories. In May 2008, Serbia conducted local elections in northern Kosovo and created parallel structures of 
local governance where international presence is ineffective. The elections were declared illegal by the 
international community but the elected bodies took over the local governance structures. The parallel 
municipalities run together with Kosovo municipalities in the north of Mitrovica, where Serb and Albanian 
populations live together, but the city is also divided into a northern and southern district, Strpce and three other 
enclaves. In the other cities, the Serb population lives in enclaves, see the Ethnic Map of Kosovo.  
43
 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
44
 According to Bekim Sejdiu, the political parties of the other minorities are fully represented in the Parliament. 
They participate in the elections besides fulfilling the reserved seats. Moreover, the Kosovo Turk Demokratik 
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Overall, after the independence, the EU has been involved in state building more than ever. 
The political situation needs to be handled within the constitutional framework considering 
the fact that the people of Kosovo increasingly perceive the government and the EU as the 
primary actors responsible for the political situation in Kosovo together with their government 
(UNDP Early Warning Report, 2008, ‘Responsibility for Kosovo’s Political Situation’). 
6.3.2 Economic Reconstruction 
The economic development of Kosovo is likely to pose the biggest challenge to the EU. There 
are currently difficulties concerning the economic development of the whole country. In the 
south, the economy is dependent on aid from the EU. In the north, the economy still depends 
on Serbian financial subsidies (Tansey and Zaum, 2009:17)45. The local population is mostly 
concerned about unemployment and underdevelopment (Graph 6.4 and Table 6.1). Seen from 
the graph, the unemployment rate is still very high. Considering the high rate young 
population, there is an exigent situation to be addressed in order to create employment and 
welfare given the very low GDP figures compared to the rest of the Western Balkans. 
 
Rate of unemployment, for 2001- 2007 given in % 
 
Graph 6.3 Unemployment, Source: Kosovo State Statistics Institute 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
Partisi (Turkish Democratic Party) is in the governing coalition -with the major political party of Kosovo. 
Bosnjaks and Roma political parties are also represented in the parliament ). However, Serbs are divided: one 
segment of the Serbian community is represented with two Ministers from the Serbian political parties, the other 
segment has chosen to boycott.  
45
 North of the Ibar River, more than 60% of income comes from Serbia, the local population has not adopted the 
euro as their currency and most of the officers get double salaries from Serbia and Kosovo. The economic gap 
between the north and the south consolidates further the de facto division of the country. For further discussion 
on the issue, see ESI, 2004 and KIPRED, 2008.  
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GDP Figures (2004-2007, current prices) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP (million €) 3.006,1 3.068,3 3.191,6 3.433,6 
GDP (per capita) 1.473 1.482 1.520 1.612 
 
Table 6.1 GDP Figures, Source: Kosovo State Statistics Institute 
 
 
The main aim of the efforts related to the economic activities has been the integration of the 
Kosovo economy within the wider structures of the world economy in line with a liberal 
peacekeeping approach.  From the outset, the EU has taken over the responsibility for 
“economic recovery and modernization of local economic structures” (Papadimitriou, 
2007:233). Economic reconstruction aims at establishing the link between security and 
development. As acknowledged by the EU, ignorance of the importance of economic 
development together with the unemployed young population would cause relapse into 
violence46. 
 
The EU has earmarked around €1.5 billion euro to Kosovo (Dempsey, 2007), 550 million of 
which will be provided as pre-accession assistance from 2007 to 2012 besides previous aid 
provided under the CARDS scheme47. The total EU amount spent on the conflict resolution 
since 1999 is €2 billion. However, the main problem of the Kosovo economy is illegal 
economic activities, which are enabled through the maintenance of war economy and fluid 
borders48. Criminality maintains strong bonds with the economic establishment and this is not 
the prerogative of only one ethnicity in Kosovo, rather covers all forms of trafficking, i.e. 
human beings, drugs, weapons etc. Fight against trafficking is still very difficult because of 
the weakness of the judicial system, corruption and the endemic illegal economy in the whole 
region (Cady, 2008 and Chassagne, 2008). State level corruption is a big impediment for the 
economy. As stated by Pond: 
 
“The record of bribes, blackmail, and threats toward international officials in Pristina by criminal networks is 
also discouraging. There are serious reports from insiders already about criminal investigations having been 
called off by Western home capitals because they cut too high into Pristina’s political and business elite and 
might destabilize Kosovar politics” (Pond, 2008:108).   
After almost ten years of presence, economic reconstruction, economic development and 
integration of Kosovo’s economy into the world economy have not been completed yet. This 
is attributed to the long ambiguity regarding the final legal status and, to some extent, the 
controversial nature of independence. However, compared to the immediate aftermath of the 
war, which destroyed all infrastructure, progress has been meaningful in terms of 
reconstruction, trade and services. Further progress has been steadily achieved so far in 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
46
 European Security Strategy, 2003 and the Council Conclusions on Security and Development 2007.  
47
 The CARDS Programme is intended to provide Community assistance to the countries of South-Eastern     
Europe between 2000-2006 with a view to their participation in the stabilization and association process with the 
European Union. 
48
 See Berdal and Malone, 2000 for further reading on the political economy of war torn countries.  
  38 
energy, industry, foreign investment and new fiscal policy, regional economic initiatives, 
banking and currency stability with the adoption of euro in order to boost the economy49.  
 
 
Further progress is expected with membership in IMF and World Bank, which would play a 
role in strengthening resource monitoring and revenue sharing, encouraging private capital 
and integrating the formalised economy into the world economy50 (Studdard, 2004). 
However, the EU was not able to create public sources and investment for sustainable 
economic growth and was not successful in eradicating illegal trade so far. For sustainable 
economic development, foreign direct investment and trade are the urgent issues to be 
addressed in the near future51.   
6.3.3 Societal Transformation: Creation of a Shared Social Space? 
“We have had a bitter experience of the ethnic discrimination during the 1990s, and then the horrors of war 
during 1998-1999. We know how it is to feel discriminated and we would by no means tolerate to see that 
somebody feels marginalized or discriminated in our country, because of its ethnicity, language or religion. We 
start from the basic human premise that Kosovo is a home of everybody who lives there and, in turn, everybody 
has obligation towards the country; its law and constitution.” 
Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey
 
 
The last pillar of EU conflict resolution deals with the transformation of social relations 
between the ethnic communities through reconciliation, building non-violent relationships 
between former adversary groups, integration of all groups into society (Bloomfiled, et. al., 
2003) and development of bottom-up democracy through civil society.  
 
“One of the most fundamental challenges of post-status Kosovo will be to forge the 
relationship between citizen and state institutions anew” (Schmidt, 2008:31). The main point 
for the EU is to create reconciliation through a notion of justice for all parts of the society. As 
stated by Malazogu, “ethnicity as we know it today is a recent phenomenon and the conflict is 
a social construct nurtured by elites that thrive in conservative and conflictuous 
environments”. For years, “ethno-entrepreneurs” found auspicious grounds to boost 
nationalistic feelings (2008:36). 
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 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
50
 At the time of writing, the IMF has offered membership to Kosovo, see www.newkosovareport.com. 
51
 Private sector investment constitutes around 20% of GDP and the trade deficit remains high around 43%. 
Privatization earnings administered by the EU has provided short relief since 1999. However, the Kosovo Trust 
Agency (KTA) has reached the end of privatization of all publicly owned enterprises (Schmidt, 2008). 
Nevertheless, FDI, imports and exports have been steadily increasing. See ECIKS Report, 2008. 
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The integration of Serbs into society 
remains the main challenge on the 
ground, which can be measured by 
looking at the level of hostility 
among the communities. Despite the 
major efforts of the international 
community, coexistence is far 
beyond realization in Kosovo. 
Although return to large-scale 
violence has not happened since 
1999, as stated by the Commission, 
“minority communities, mostly 
Serbs and Roma, face 
discrimination, serious restrictions in 
freedom of movement, access to 
education, health care, public utilities and social assistance, due to the poor quality of services 
and security concerns” (Progress Report, 2007:9). As shown by Graph 6.4, although the 
willingness to work together with the members of other communities has been incrementally 
increasing, the overall percentage shows that the integration of the two communities is still 
missing. For instance, the Serb contribution to the KPS has mostly withdrawn after Kosovo 
declared its independence from Serbia.  
 
Another problem is related to the Serb enclaves in the northern part of Kosovo. They have 
some security concerns when travelling into Albanian majority areas52. Kosovo authorities 
continuously state that the integration of the Serb community into public life is one of the 
priorities of Kosovo through the 
granting of extensive minority rights at 
the local level, inclusion of minority 
representatives in the legislative and 
executive and quotas of recruitment 
from minority communities for public 
services. Kosovo state considers these 
efforts as one of the most democratic 
practices given the size of the 
minorities and attributes the lingering 
problems to the parallel establishments 
in Serb dominated areas. For instance, 
Sejdiu states that those parallel 
institutions commit illegal “political 
and economic crime” supported by 
Belgrade. For him, these parallel 
structures are the main obstacle concerning the integration of Serbs into society53. 
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 See New York Times, Multimedia Report: Endgame in Kosovo for a stunning explanation of situation on the 
ground, 2008. 
53
 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
 
Graph 6.5 Employment 
 
Graph 6.4 Interethnic Relations 
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There is some promising evidence of integration if we look at the employment among ethnic 
communities (Graph 6.5), showing that the Serb population has been increasingly integrated 
into the job market. 
 
The reality of spatial and psychological separation of the communities necessitates further 
reconciliation and serious negotiations among the parties for years to come. The EU 
emphasises the role of civil society and NGOs as one of the focal points of societal 
transformation in Kosovo. Civil society has emerged strongly in post-war Kosovo, mostly 
through contributions from international community. “What remains ahead are challenges of 
institutionalization, opening the democratic process to input from civil society, and a clearer 
articulation of a collective identity for NGO-s in relation to the rest of society” (KIPRED, 
2005:40). The Commission often emphasises the importance of civil society in the 
democratization process of Kosovo and works towards collaboration with societal actors54. 
However, to what extent and how civil society is willing to contribute, and whether the EU 
will take their input into consideration while shaping its strategy on the ground, remains 
vague.  
 
Donor dependence is also a major problem in Kosovo civil society (Pouligny, 2004), which 
prevents indigenous civil society development. NGOs have been mostly criticised as working 
along ethnic lines of society. The boom in the quantity of NGOs in Kosovo does not 
substitute the need for an independent and self-sustaining civil society working towards 
common goals of all ethnic groups. The EU should aim towards creating a civil society 
working with all groups in order to facilitate reconciliation. Furthermore, the Union should 
release patron-client relations with civil society and adopt a neutral function in terms of 
providing ground for equal contribution of all communal groups into the developing civil 
society and public space. 
6.4 Is the EU Moving from Rhetoric to Substance? 
Challenges for the EU in Kosovo 
 
“Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new 
chapter in its history — one that is based upon peace, stability and prosperity for all.” 
 
Marti Ahtisaari, 2007
 
 
An overall analysis of EU involvement in Kosovo across context and engagement in conflict 
resolution is provided in this section in order to pinpoint certain opportunities and constrains 
that affect the policy impact of the EU in Kosovo revealed by the analysis of the 
comprehensive conflict resolution involvement of the EU across three thematic areas.  
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 For instance, in March 2009 the European Commission called on Kosovo civil society to contribute to the 
2009 Progress Report.  
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An assessment of EU’s presence in Kosovo as the main actor of conflict resolution reveals 
many challenges on the ground, namely; questions regarding legality of independence 
declaration in terms of international law, development of local capacities in Kosovo, EU’s 
internal coherence in policy implementation and Kosovo’s integration into the EU in the long 
run, each of which, in turn, will be discussed in detail. 
6.4.1 Status Question: Falling Dominoes of Secessionism? 
The legacies of war and the up-to-date engagement of the international community with 
different aims and instruments in conflict resolution have created a complex situation so far. 
The blurred independence of Kosovo in the eyes of the international community has lately 
shaped the context of political capacity building. The ‘unilateral’ declaration of independence 
did not bring Kosovo full integration with the international community. In October 2008, the 
UN General Assembly supported the Serbian proposal requesting an opinion from the ICJ 
regarding the legal status of the declaration of independence. For Kosovo, the issue of 
independence is “a reality”, which is not “only a fulfilment of the just aspiration of the people 
of Kosovo, but it has also brought stability to the Balkans” 55 According to Sejdiu, “this is 
demonstrated by the fact that majority of states which were directly affected by the conflicts 
in Kosovo and former Yugoslavia have recognised Kosovo’s independence including most of 
the EU members, the US and many countries in the region. The independence of Kosovo was 
a natural conclusion of the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia opening another chapter 
in the region’s history”.56 
 
On the other hand, the situation might have different implications for the EU. The EU has 
been defining its engagement within Kosovo as legitimate based on the UN mandate and the 
consent of the Kosovo authorities. As stated by Noutcheva, “the big dilemma underpinning 
Kosovo’s independence bid is whether to give precedence to the right to self-determination or 
to the principle of territorial integrity” (2007:11). Thus, an ICJ ruling against independence 
would have implications for the EU regarding its internal incoherence and the international 
legitimacy of its status in Kosovo. First, a ruling against the legitimacy of the independent 
status of Kosovo based on international law will put the EU’s engagement in Kosovo under 
question. The claims of effective multilateralism, respect for international law and norms on 
the part of the EU have so far been the legitimizing features of EU civilian and military 
engagements. The impact and legitimacy of EU foreign policy would be severely damaged at 
home and abroad, if the ICJ rules against the legitimacy of independence. Second, Kosovo’s 
situation runs the risk of providing precedence for further separatist claims in the 
neighbourhood of the EU. By supporting the independence of Kosovo, the EU has 
unwillingly put itself into a debate over ‘frozen conflicts’ in its neighbourhood. Especially in 
the Caucasus, there are already claims of independence supported by Russia on similar 
grounds. A chain of independence declarations, needless to say, would destabilize the EU’s 
neighbourhood.  
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 Author’s Interviews with Bekim Sejdiu and Guner Ureya, Charge d’Affairs and Deputy Head of Kosovo 
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6.4.2 Illegal Economy and Corruption 
People in Kosovo think that the main problems that Kosovo faces are still economic (UNDP, 
2008:4). The large economic aid for almost ten years has not resolved economic problems. 
The level of corruption in Kosovo can only be measured by public perception polls and 
media-NGO reports. However, corruption is closely linked to the absence of the rule of law 
and the unwillingness of political elites to deal with this embedded problem (Zogiani, 2009). 
According to Zogiani, the reports and cases on corruption mainly emphasize non-political 
bodies such as police officers, judges, etc. but not the biggest corruption cases of political 
figures (ibid.). 
 
The EU has to organise its activities at the local level in order to “channel funds in ways that 
avoid Pristina based corruption” (Tansey and Zaum, 2009:18). Lack of capacity to fight 
corruption and insufficient application of the rule of law within the existing institutions show 
that democratically elected governments and institutions created after the conflict do not 
demonstrate that they have gained an understanding of culture and the functioning of 
democratic institutions. The main challenge for the fight against the shadow economy and 
corruption is ensuring economic development in order to “create a favourable investment 
climate by accelerating the resolution of property issues and creating legal security for 
investors” (Schmidt, 2008:30).  
6.4.3 Local Capacities: not real bottom-up transformation?  
 
The capacities developed by Kosovo on the way to become a state are mixed since it depends 
on the criteria when assessing local development. There have been significant achievements 
in terms of institution and legal framework building considering the fact that “everything has 
been started from zero”. The independence has clearly brought a change in the self-perception 
of Kosovo regarding local capacities. Sejdiu states that “after independence the status 
question has been solved for once and forever”, now Kosovo sees the EU as a partner to assist 
the country towards democratization. Rather than holding patronage relations, the 
membership aspiration of Kosovo to the EU and NATO is the main driving force for 
strengthening local capacities in Kosovo57.  
 
However, in terms of societal transformation, “there can be no doubt that the identification of 
the Kosovo Serbs with the state of Kosovo is almost nil” (Schmidt, 2008:34). The issue of 
northern Kosovo is beyond the current limits of the government and the handling of the 
situation is left to the international community. Moreover, the state level corruption caused by 
the illegal economy impeding on the socio-economic development cast doubts whether the 
EU has been successful so far in establishing a self-sustaining peace with local ownership. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
57
 Bekim Sejdiu, Kosovo Chargé d’Affairs to Turkey, author’s interview, May 2009. 
 
  43 
6.4.4  Coherence 
EU member states disguised the incoherent approach within the EU by abstaining from voting 
in the General Assembly regarding ICJ ruling on the status of Kosovo. This situation has 
revealed that a common position regarding the status of Kosovo has not been settled within 
the Union. The lack of unanimity regarding the status of Kosovo among member states has 
left the mandate of EULEX and other state building efforts ambiguous. Sticking to the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan in order to strengthen the institutional and socio-
economic development of Kosovo seems the only pragmatic solution, since all members have 
accepted the proposal without relation to the final status.  
 
However, the problem of incoherence is self-revealing on the ground as well. Policy-making 
still remains ad hoc, each mission has a different planning and structure (Aggestam et.al, 
208:159), which prevents the accumulation of institutional memory. The unclear boundaries 
of the mandate between the first and second pillar and the lack of clearly defined common 
goal at the EU level prevent an effective policy implementation. The division between the 
Council and the Commission not only “reinforces compartmentalisation of policy-making” 
(ibid: 160), but also creates confusion on the ground diverting the attention of the EU away 
from local needs58. More coherence within the Union would create effective policies on the 
ground and would increase the chance of EULEX to engage Kosovo entirely and address 
immediate challenges. 
6.4.5 European Integration of Kosovo 
The EU has shown its commitment to integrate the Balkans into the Union through the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which focuses on the respect of international 
peace and stability, the development of better neighbourly relations, democratic principles 
and human rights, minority rights, international law principles and the rule of law (Ioannides, 
2007:84)59. EU membership aspirations bear significant transformation power through the 
creation of new prospects for resolving the conflict and incentives for the parties to end their 
hostility.  
 
Kosovo has clear expectations regarding its membership in the long term and sees this 
solution as the final outcome of state building and conflict resolution60. Kosovo authorities 
continuously state their goal of normalising relations with the rest of the international 
community including Serbia, and their focus on economic development and European 
integration in the future. In this sense, the EU would be the main stabilizing actor in Kosovo 
using integration as leverage in the long run. However, democratization and state building is a 
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 Dr. Anna Jarstad, Uppsala University, author’s interview, April, 2009.  
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 The EU has transformed its regional approach into SAP in five countries in the region, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia. Kosovo was tied into the process with the 
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Commission initiated the plan. After its independence Kosovo was integrated into SAP through Europe 
Agreement. The overall process became contractual through a SAA with each country. SAAs state conditionality 
clauses and country specific compliance, See Pippan, 2004 for an excellent overview of the SAP process, the 
first of which was signed with Macedonia. 
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 Guner Ureya, Deputy Head of Kosovo Mission to Ankara, author’s interview, March, 2009. 
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long process. While ensuring the long-term commitment for democratization from Kosovo 
authorities, the EU needs to share the burden by inserting commitments and incentives into 
the process. As discussed below, the ‘raw’ application of conditionality might not foster 
conflict resolution and democratization in target countries. 
An analysis of EU engagement in Kosovo conflict resolution has revealed five main 
challenges- legal dimensions, economic and social transformation, internal coherence of EU, 
integration of Kosovo into the Union- for the EU to tackle, which in turn affects the policy 
impact of the EU on the ground. Given these challenges for the EU in Kosovo conflict 
resolution, Macedonia offers a good comparative case for further understanding the policy 
impact of EU in conflict resolution where the study turns to in the next section. 
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7 Drawing upon Macedonian 
Experience of Institution-building? 
 
“Many do not yet understand what is the meaning of federative Yugoslavia. It does not mean the drawing of a 
borderline between this or that federative unit.... No! Those border lines, as I see them, must be something like 
white veins in a marble staircase. The lines between federated states in a federal Yugoslavia are not lines of 
separation, but of union” 
Tito, Speech held in Zagreb, May 1945(cited in Hondius, 1964) 
“… the Yugoslav idea remained a unifying ideology, not an identity, subject to a variety of interpretations. 
When that dream came to true at the end of the First World War, the articulation of several South Slav identities 
was already well advanced, yet the founders of the Yugoslav state wanted to treat them as subgroups of one 
nation- an ideal or an illusion?”   
Pavlowitch, 2007
“The depth of the recent ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia tragically confirmed that Yugoslav nations would not 
have accepted the internal division of the country if this division were intended to be permanent, drawing 
different repercussions for their individual and group rights.” 
Trbovich, 2009
 
Considered together, two important factors differ from Kosovo in Macedonia: first, the 
conditioning factors of different war legacies affecting the attitude of the EU when dealing 
conflict resolution; and second, the different tools of engagement or the extra leverage of 
candidacy in Macedonia.  
 
Bieber discusses that “dominance by one nation has been a strong feature of institutional 
representation during socialism in Macedonia and Kosovo” since group representation was 
not applied in the system of Yugoslavia (Bieber, 2004:4). Thus, “institutionalisation of 
ethnicity might appear to be a ‘hangover’ from Communist Yugoslavia (USIP, 2000:6). 
However, it has affected these countries differently in their post-conflict contexts. Moreover, 
the influx of Albanians into Macedonia after the violence in Kosovo in 1999 has changed the 
ethnic balance in the country61. 
 
Conditioning factors have been in favour of conflict resolution in Macedonia. Before the 2001 
conflict, there was an informal power-sharing at the government level since one Albanian 
party had always been a part of the ruling coalition. Compared to the other examples in the 
region, the level of multi-ethnic coexistence “was advanced to a level unprecedented 
elsewhere in the Balkans” (Mintchev, 2001:25). Although this elite cooperation at the 
government level was not reflected at the local level and ethnic Macedonians and Albanians 
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continued to live separately, ethnic cleansing of Albanians at Kosovo’s scale did never 
happen. 
 
Given the contextual differences between the two cases, the approach of the EU has been 
different compared to Kosovo. Because the EU was dealing with an established state, from 
the very start, the EU has been a facilitator and mediator between the parties in Macedonia, 
while in Kosovo, NATO and UN were the main actors at the beginning. The first response 
after the conflict erupted was the establishment of a shuttle diplomacy between the parties 
aiming at a balanced view between the conflicting parties. However, contrary to Kosovo, the 
EU preferred to address the Macedonian government and rejected any formal talks with 
National Liberation Army (NLA) rebellions. While condemning Albanian extremism, the EU 
pushed the Macedonian government to start a political dialogue with Albanian political 
parties as a facilitator and mediator between the conflict parties in order to prevent further 
escalation. 
 
The peace agreement reflected the EU’s position extensively. The parties to the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (OFA) committed themselves to the constitutional amendments, 
legislative acts and structural reforms in order to better represent the ethnic communities. It 
also provided the international community, especially the EU, with a mandate to coordinate 
the international community’s efforts. The EU approach can be defined as a dual track, where 
the Commission takes the responsibility for long-term police reform and the Council deals 
with ‘urgent needs’ in support of the OFA (Ioannides, 2007:82). 
 
In 2003, the EU deployed EUPOL Proxima with the aim of assisting the development of a 
democratic and accountable police force62. In this sense, it has introduced a Western notion of 
policing in Macedonia. As stated by the International Crisis Group report: 
 
“Proxima has been the only multilateral entity able to use the leverage created by Macedonian desire for EU 
membership and to enjoy consistent working level access. Its strength has been its ability to work closely with 
government entities, pressing them to talk and collaborate with each other. One of its most effective initiatives 
was the institution of regular meetings among officials from the public prosecutor’s office and the interior 
ministry. By focusing on real-life situations, including legal and operational aspects of investigations, 
surveillance and witness protection, the two entities began to communicate and coordinate. Though still limited, 
this helps law enforcement authorities focus on a common objective rather than engage in finger-pointing.” 
(ICG, 2006:9). 
 
 
Proxima’s implementation on the ground shows some similarities with EULEX in Kosovo 
namely, it was not able to tackle the problem of organized crime during the first year due to 
limited working hours and equipment of the staff. However, the shortcomings were addressed 
countrywide by expanding the geographical scope of Proxima (Ioannides, 2007:95), 
something not viable in Kosovo due to the opposition from some parts of the society. While 
the police was improved in certain ways, certain problems regarding security sector reform 
seem persistent in EU practice. First, corruption and political patronage is still a major 
problem in Macedonia -similar to Kosovo, where the judiciary suffers from unfair trials and 
insecurity for witnesses and court officials (Cady, 2008, author’s translation). 
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 Council Joint Action, 29 September 2003. The one-year mandate was extended for another year and then 
replaced by an EU Police Advisory Team that lasted until September 2006. Then, the Commission deployed a 
Field Monitoring team for supervising the police reforms in the country (Merlingen, 2007). 
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Second, although the OFA demanded a more ethnically diverse force compared to EULEX, 
the involvement of local municipalities concerning the selection of police officers and an 
overall increase in transparency and accountability63, the EU approach of policing in 
Macedonia was criticized as ‘imagined high standards of European policing’, thus creating a 
hierarchy and “an unbridgeable gap between the illusive subject position of the good 
European copper and the really existing subject position of local coppers” (Merlingen, 
2007:446). In other words, the EU practice is conceived as an ‘inflated sense of superiority’ in 
the role of a norm promoter (ibid: 446). The impact of the EU denotes the introduction of a 
Western notion of policing, i.e. inclusive of ethnic groups and accountability. However, 
actions without subsuming the local traditions raise questions about the sustainability of the 
conflict resolution efforts and undermine “the value and agency of Macedonian stakeholders” 
(ibid: 447). The “extra-legal power of the EU” (ibid) in running the state and transforming 
social practices through creating ‘best practice’ is likely to overshadow positive developments 
in security sector in Kosovo as well. 
 
The nature of power-sharing also differs in Macedonia from Kosovo. Macedonia does not 
have segmented autonomy for different communities at the formal level, but the OFA 
supports enhanced local self-government over several issue areas, which means that the civic 
features of the state remain intact. Concerning Kosovo, the EU and the Kosovo constitution 
aim at a model of power-sharing between different entities giving extensive ruling64, 
representation in the cabinet65 and veto rights66. Nevertheless, both approaches can be 
considered similar by aiming at cross-ethnic cooperation and each community has rigid 
independent decision-making rights and veto powers, which creates a kind of symbiotic 
relationship. What makes Macedonia different from the Kosovo case is the granting of 
candidate status in order to ensure the implementation of the OFA, thus combining 
community and intergovernmental instruments in conflict resolution in Macedonia. The 
granting of candidate status clearly sent the message that the EU would deal with the state of 
Macedonia to settle the issue through agreement and would not accept a change in the 
territorial boundaries in favour of the Albanian minority (Novakova, 2006:111). The decision 
to grant candidate status to Macedonia is seen as political, i.e. not really reflecting the 
country’s progress of newly adopted legislation, but as a further incentive for reforms. 
Giandomenico argues that despite the lack of capacities, “the prospect of EU membership was 
used as a carrot to end a conflict for the first time” (2009:91). “Overall, the country lacks 
human rights culture, where the civil society should play a significant role […]. The civic 
sector is mostly concerned with following trends in international donations, without in fact 
initiating forums for public debate and with no capacity to bring social changes” (Novakova, 
2006:102-3)67. Candidate status was mostly designed as a means for further implementing the 
OFA and fulfilling obligations under the SAA (Novakova, 2006, Fouere, 2007)68.  
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 See OFA, op. cit., Annex C, Implementation and Confidence Building Measures, Paragraph 5, “Non 
Discrimination and Equitable Representation” and the National Police Reform Strategy, February 2004. 
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 Constitution of Kosovo, Chapter X. 
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 Constitution of Kosovo, Art. 96. 
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 Double majority applies for the adoption of legislation concerning vital interest, Constitution of Kosovo Art. 
81. 
67
 See Commission decisions on Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents for 2007-09 for FYROM, April 
2007. 
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 See also Council Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 December 2005, Brussels, 15914/1/05 REV 1. 
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Similar to political capacity building, the economic assistance has taken the form of 
conditionality within the candidacy perspective in contrast to patronage relations with 
Kosovo. This has also affected societal relations. Although faith on the Albanian side in the 
reforms and the police are still low compared to Macedonians, membership of the Union is a 
cross-cutting cleavage for many people in Macedonia as their common future (UNDP, 2007). 
 
In short, different conditioning factors before the war and varying degrees of war legacies in 
both countries have altered the way EU has dealt with conflict resolution so far. In turn, 
conditioning factors and EU’s attitude have affected the level of societal change by creating 
incentives or protracted hostilities between the parties of the conflict.    
7.1 What does Macedonia tell us about Kosovo? 
Macedonia provides a reference point for two reasons: first, overall, conflict resolution in 
Macedonia highlighted the importance of civilian crisis management for the EU. Being first in 
terms of planning and performance, the mission in Macedonia provides a learning process and 
helps setting the standards of future missions. In other words, the experience in Macedonia 
reveals the potential shortcomings and prospects of the Kosovo police mission, and the 
importance of conditioning factors for conflict resolution. Second, it provides a comparative 
perspective for the impact of different tools employed by the EU with the aim of conflict 
resolution, namely EU candidacy tied to conflict resolution and the prospect of future EU 
membership. Table 7.1 provides a short summary of the comparison of the two cases across 
the three dimensions established for analysis of the policy impact of the EU in conflict 
resolution. 
 
What are the implications of the Macedonian case for conflict resolution in Kosovo and the 
EU’s impact? The case of Macedonia plays a particular role in the strength of the 
commitment towards the Western Balkans. Macedonia was the first major involvement of the 
EU in the Western Balkans and it contained elements of crisis management, post-conflict 
reconstruction and political commitment. But most importantly, the prospect of EU 
membership was loudly and clearly used as a means of stopping the conflict and “contributed 
to cementing the enlargement policy as a foreign policy tool” (Giandomenico, 2009:93). 
Candidate status was granted as an extension of the military and police missions and has also 
become a tool for conflict resolution. It has become one of the issues in the Council’s and 
Solana’s agenda, also showing how an area of Commission expertise has been put into the 
conflict resolution framework, tough the separation of grant of candidate status and start of 
negotiations for the country (ibid:96).  
The further step taken by the EU in the form of granting candidate status tells that OFA, as 
the main tool of conflict resolution in Macedonia, was not able to create political capacities on 
its own. The biggest leverage the EU used is the prospect of membership as the final outcome 
of conflict resolution. Similar leverage has been buttressed in the whole Western Balkans with 
the Feira and Thessaloniki Councils. As stated by Giandomenico, the EU offers a long-term 
commitment for stabilization in Kosovo and in the wider region and strongly ties itself to 
conflict resolution with strong membership rhetoric (ibid). 
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 Kosovo Macedonia 
Conditioning Factors 
*Institutionalised division of Serb 
and Albanian communities with 
continuing spatial segregation of 
communities 
*Previous oppression and under-
representation of one group; 
*Large-scale ethnic war; 
*Ruled as trusteeship by 
international community for a long 
time; 
*Blurred status of independence; 
*No agreement between parties to 
the conflict yet; 
*Legitimacy of EU presence is 
questioned. 
 
*Previous political culture of 
inclusion of minority community at 
state level; 
*Same spatial segregation of 
communities; 
*Brink of civil war; 
*State has never collapsed, 
continued to function weakly 
during armed conflict stage; 
*One state solution, no claims of 
independence; 
*Parties agreed on conflict 
resolution agreement with 
sometimes different claims 
regarding implementation; 
*No claim against legitimacy of 
EU presence. 
EU Conflict Resolution 
*Long term EU involvement 
across political capacity building, 
economic reconstruction and 
societal change; 
*Integration perspective through 
SAP and conditionality; 
*Institutional incoherence as the 
main problem at decision-making 
and policy level. 
 
*PLUS formal candidate status 
Local Capacities 
*Lack of local ownership in 
conflict resolution process with 
dependency on foreign support; 
*Problems of corruption preventing 
socio-economic development; 
*Judiciary as the main problem. 
*Police mission is the most 
extensive international 
involvement, state has never 
disintegrated as in Kosovo; 
*No shared authority with the EU 
at state level; 
*Corruption is common 
phenomenon in the entire region 
*Judiciary still weak. 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 Comparison: Kosovo and Macedonia 
Similarly in Kosovo, European Partnership in form of the SAP is clearly the motor for long-
term political, economic and social stabilization. It offers positive and negative conditionality 
to implement the reforms and European integration in the long term. However, as shown by 
the Macedonian case, the membership perspective, even when granted in the form of 
candidate status, does not guarantee that enlargement negotiations will take place. However, 
integration prospect as a tool for conflict resolution should not be left to random choices and 
mere rhetoric by the EU. As shown in the case of Macedonia, even if a country is quick to 
integrate into the EU through the SAP, there is further need of guidance and clearer 
benchmarks for a case like Kosovo in the form of “defining as precisely as possible the steps 
to be taken” in order to “navigate through the jungle of EU conditionality” (ibid: 241-2). In 
other words, if the high expectations of Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans are not fulfilled in 
the long run, the credibility of the EU as a conflict resolution actor capable of providing post-
conflict stabilization would be undermined.  
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8 Analysis of Policy Impact: ‘An Aria 
from EU Variations’? 
As stated in the beginning, the overall impact of the EU in conflict resolution is shaped by 
three interrelated factors: conditioning factors of the conflict, EU conflict resolution 
engagement- political capacity building, economic reconstruction and societal change-, and 
local capacities developed as a result of conflict resolution efforts. This section will provide 
an overall analysis of the EU’s policy impact drawing upon the case study on Kosovo and the 
short comparison with Macedonia. 
8.1 Conditioning Factors 
8.1.1 Internal Context 
The legacy of war, the level of reconciliation between groups and the previous existence of 
peaceful coexistence traditions are important internal factors affecting the impact of EU. In 
the post-conflict period these are generally not promising due to the brutal ethnic conflict in 
these countries, impairing the EU’s effectiveness on the ground. The comparison between 
Macedonia and Kosovo in terms of internal conditioning factors reveals that when there is a 
more favourable context, agreement between the conflicting parties can be achieved easily 
and parties to the conflict are committed to the implementation of peace agreement. 
Otherwise, the shift in the internal conditions could be possible with the help of long-term 
engagement and ‘social engineering’ in order to overcome the institutionalised hatred among 
the groups, which has not realised in Kosovo yet. 
8.1.2 Cooperation with Other Actors on the Ground: ‘too many cooks 
spoiling the broth’? 
The tension among the international actors in Kosovo and to certain extent Macedonia is a 
result of a ‘hands on’ approach of all actors in the whole process. Vaguely defined borders for 
extensive international mandates create ineffectiveness on the ground. Since the EU is a 
latecomer in the conflict resolution arena compared to the other actors, EU and other 
organizations’ practices might alter the outcomes or impair the tools used for conflict 
resolution. For instance, although transformation of competencies from UN and NATO to the 
EU missions has been realized to certain extent in the Western Balkans with the increasing 
responsibilities assumed by the EU, it is highly unlikely that this open-ended process will lead 
to the EU being the sole actor on the ground (Schneckener, 2002). In Kosovo, the ambiguity 
regarding ‘who is in charge of what’ creates confusion for local capacity development. The 
main side effect of multiple external third parties is that local parties are either constrained by 
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the inaction of the international community and wait until the ‘foreigners’ respond to certain 
local necessities or they hide behind the presence of the international actors and find excuses 
for the deteriorating socio-economic situation in the post-conflict situation69. 
 
An overcrowded arena and incoherence of international efforts create duplication of 
programmes and initiatives causing waste of time and resources. In Macedonia, the EU has 
been the main actor of international involvement which supported the development of 
relatively effective conflict resolution, whereas in Kosovo the tensions regarding authority 
among major international actors still need to be cleared for effective conflict resolution.  
8.2 EU Conflict Resolution 
8.2.1 Political Will of Member States 
Consultation and coordination between member states have increasingly become 
institutionalized in the foreign policy field. However, the risk of putting member states’ 
foreign policies together and agreeing only on the lowest common denominator has not been 
eliminated. As seen in the case of conflict resolution in Kosovo, improvements in speaking 
with one voice are strongly needed in order to clarify the mandate of the EU on the ground 
and improve the effectiveness of conflict resolution efforts. Internal agreement, when applied 
in a few cases like in Macedonia, has fostered to decision-making and effective 
implementation in conflict resolution. 
8.2.2 Building Capacities 
The capacities of the EU in dealing with civilian and military engagements are still 
developing. Although the EU instruments have developed at a tremendous pace after the 
Kosovo crisis, available instruments still remain in national domains with the lack of proper 
pooling of capacities at the EU level and of inter-operationalization of those mechanisms for 
effective conflict resolution. The police missions on the ground continue to pursue national 
priorities to some extent and insight from the field is wasted or ignored proving there is a 
narrow but continuing gap between capabilities and expectations (Hill, 1993). Tocci argues 
that in order to further develop effective capabilities and foster the actorness in conflict 
resolution, the EU should focus on ‘doing better what it has already been doing’ in the 
neighbourhood instead of extending its limited capacities to the other parts of the world70. 
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 Dr. Anna Jarstad, Uppsala University, author’s interview, April, 2009. 
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 Natalie Tocci, Research Fellow, author’s interview, May, 2009. 
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8.2.3 Coherence within EU Institutions 
Coherence provides the effectiveness in using instruments on the ground towards the aim of 
conflict resolution, realizing goals and having real policy impact on the ground. Contradiction 
between the priorities and instruments of different EU institutions and lack of a common 
strategic goal create frictions and delays and undermine the input of the EU on the process. In 
order to overcome confusion and ineffectiveness, the artificial division of pillars should be 
bridged by regular inter-institutional links between the offices of the EUSR, the ICO/ICR and 
the Commission in Kosovo. Coherence within EU policies, especially towards the Western 
Balkans where the EU has been the leading actor of conflict resolution, is the cornerstone of 
the future development and success of EU conflict resolution. 
8.2.4 Europeanization as a Means for Stabilization: an exhaustive list 
of demandeurs? 
Against the background of fragmented structures after the conflict, the EU increasingly uses 
the integration prospect71 to get the desired outcomes. This is a unique approach to conflict 
resolution; however, conditionality does not work in the same way as for East European 
Countries, since the proper incentive of future membership is not linked to a clear accession 
prospect (Papadimitriou, 2007; Tocci, 2008). Except Macedonia, none of the countries in the 
region has been granted formal candidate status. Western Balkan countries expect a clear 
‘paradigm shift’ from a stability and reconstruction framework to membership.  
 
However, the unwillingness of the EU to tie conflict resolution efforts to an eventual 
membership diminishes the role of the EU in consolidating democracy and economic systems 
in the region (Turkes and Gokgoz, 2006). Even more, Tocci questions Europeanization, as a 
proper means for conflict resolution. While conflict resolution is related with local ownership 
and indigenous capacity development, Europeanization is about becoming a part of decision-
making and devoting state competences to the EU institutions. Hence, Europeanization and 
conflict resolution are not compatible and even work against each other.72 
 
In short, how the EU will tackle the aspirations of membership in the region remains 
ambiguous. Even though it is very unlikely in the medium term, membership for Kosovo and 
other countries in the Western Balkans is likely to come up as the possible next step of 
sustainable conflict resolution, not only because the prospect of enlargement is the biggest 
foreign policy tool of the EU, but also because the EU is bound by its rhetoric of 
integration/promise to integrate of these former conflict zones into the peaceful EU-zone.  
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 Political conditionality, namely the democracy, human rights and rule of law clauses, is the main element for 
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8.2.5 Norm versus Interests: an outdated dilemma? 
As stated by Tocci, “rather than assuming that the EU is a normative international player 
simply by virtue of its ‘different’ non-state nature”, it is best conceptualised as an actor acting 
“dramatically differently in terms of goals and means at a different time and in a different 
environment” (2008:1). In line with the structural foreign policy approach in this study, a 
mere norm versus interest debate is not enough to explain EU behaviour in conflict resolution. 
The interests are embedded in the EU’s identity and its policies of conflict resolution. In other 
words, “[t]here are no interests outside social norms and norm promoting agents can behave 
as instrumentally and strategically as other actors” (Börzel and Risse, 2007:3).  
 
The Kosovo case is one of the main illustrations of this point, where the EU has abolished 
strict normative means, i.e. independence and non-intervention in terms of international law, 
but still continues to support normative ends of conflict resolution. In Kosovo, the EU has 
stretched the interpretation of international law and the UNSC Resolution in order to despatch 
the police mission after the independence. Although the importance of multilateralism and 
international rules has continuously been emphasised, non-normative means have been 
employed with the aim of conflict resolution and democratization of Kosovo (Noutcheva, 
2007).  
 
8.3 Local Capacities: conditio sine qua non! 
8.3.1 Local Ownership 
Local ownership helps mobilizing popular support for conflict resolution. The lack of public 
support provides two main obstacles to the process. First, it supports the spoilers, which can 
use the hostilities within society in order to deteriorate the inter-ethnic relations, and second, 
political elites will be unwilling or uncertain about implementing the reforms (Bieber, 
2004:17). Ignoring the locals in the long run might delegitimize the presence of the EU and 
block the implementation of conflict resolution since local parties become suspicious about 
the intentions of the EU‘s presence. 
 
The EU practices in Kosovo and Macedonia show “brings to bear on problems in poor and 
conflict-ridden societies, humanizes and improves the life of populations, but it also creates 
patterns of arbitrary domination between internationals and locals” (Merlingen, 2007:449). 
The engagement of the EU in conflict resolution is normally based on values and norms, 
namely the right to intervene to solve the conflict on humanitarian security grounds and on 
the consent between political elites. However, as stated by Jarstad, the local population does 
not elect the EU institutions on the ground and this is likely to create accountability problems 
in the long run73. In short, EU conflict resolution does not necessarily have an emancipatory 
nature for the locals especially when local ownership is not properly developed. The most 
common problems faced on the ground are cultural differences between third party actors and 
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locals, and the difficulty for the mission staff on the ground to tailor orientations in conflict 
resolution when necessary (Diehl, 1998:51-3). The biggest challenge today of the activities of 
EU conflict resolution is to link international and local practices and to ensure that a self-
sustaining peace is underway. As stated by Jarstad, how to promote local democracy and 
other capacities is not properly reflected upon. Rather, the Union is interested in how to 
prevent a spillover of security threats into the EU zone of peace74. 
8.3.2 Neo-Liberal Agenda and Local Capacity Development 
The inherent paradox in liberal internationalism when applied in the context of post-conflict 
stabilization impedes local capacity development; namely, the process of political and 
economic liberalization generates “societal competition as a means of achieving political 
stability and economic prosperity” (Paris, 1997:57), which could easily lead to mobilization 
of groups at another level. The distant communities within one state generally lack the ability 
to tolerate and absorb any social competition inherent in liberal democracies after the war- as 
in the common practice of institutionalized political expression in established democracies, 
where “political conflict is not merely normal, it is generally thought to be rather healthy” 
(Dahl, 1986:14).  
 
Similarly, democratization and conflict resolution are not considered to be compatible. 
Rather, there is a dilemma between democratization and conflict resolution: after an ethno-
political conflict, some groups which had mobilised for conflict have the tendency to continue 
to use their available networks and they have better access to resources. Democratization runs 
the risk of empowering domestic spoilers to return to violence or continue illegal activities75. 
Given the free environment for expression and elections, former conflict entrepreneurs might 
continue to act, only through different channels. For instance, the high level of corruption and 
illegal economy within the public institutions in Kosovo remains as a legacy of war 
economies owners, which have established links within the state structures today, 
demonstrating the risk of liberal peacebuilding. 
8.3.3 Undesired Outcome: further institutionalization of ethnicity 
through conflict resolution 
The outcomes of conflict resolution, especially power-sharing agreements, can be 
overemphasizing ethnicity because rigid institutional structures of representation and strict 
veto rights might create an unintentional institutionalization of ethnic tensions. It is related to 
the need to achieve political capacity building and societal transformation simultaneously. 
While political capacity building requires the creation of common institutions and 
participation from all segments of society, societal transformation is related to nation 
building, which refers to the fact that “parties to the conflict perceive and accept both their 
own group and their adversary as part of demos” (Gromes, 2009:3). In the aftermath of the 
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ethnic conflict, the lack of unity between the groups regarding to which state they belong 
bears the risk of the rejection of common institutions, at least by one side of the conflict, i.e. 
the Serbs in Kosovo.  
 
Thus, “under the starting conditions of ethnically divided post-civil war societies and with the 
objective of democratization these interactions seem to result in a vicious circle: A lack of 
democratic state institutions impedes progress in nation-building, while insufficient 
acceptance of a common state inhibits state-building. Due to this vicious circle democracy 
cannot evolve” (Gromes, 2009:4). The conflict resolution efforts by the EU aiming to ensure 
participation and representation of all groups might create further institutionalisation of 
ethnicity through over-representation of minorities in the legislative and executive or strict 
quotas of recruitment based on ethnic background in public institutions, as already practiced 
in Kosovo and Macedonia after the violent conflicts have eliminated. It constitutes an obstacle 
for releasing ethnic ties within the society.  
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9 Conclusion  
9.1 Summary of Findings 
Whether the international community likes it or not, ethnic discourse continues to dominate 
the political arena in the Western Balkans after almost twenty years passed since the federal 
states of Yugoslavia began disintegrating. While ethnicity is not an independent feature of the 
conflicts and generally related to economic underdevelopment and under-representation, 
ethnic belonging continues to matter to people when they are applying for jobs and dealing 
with state institutions. Absence of armed-violence is now a widely shared phenomenon in the 
former Yugoslav area. However, it did not bring a final solution to the previous conflicts in 
the region. It obviously makes the region dependent on external intervention for resolving the 
protracted conflicts and for assisting the political and economic development. The focus of 
this study, Kosovo, is the main example of how the still politicized nature of social life and 
ethicized political life dominate the region.  
 
The study has aimed at analyzing the EU’s policy impact on conflict resolution in Kosovo. 
Drawing upon the theory of comprehensive conflict resolution -embracing political capacity 
building, economic reconstruction and societal change- and a social constructivist 
conceptualization of EUFP, the study reveals that Kosovo has become an important litmus 
test for the development of EU conflict resolution capabilities and identity. After decades of 
silence, the Kosovo conflict has aroused the interest of the EU in terms of conflict resolution.  
 
Concerned with the increased number of ethno-political conflicts in the world coupled with 
the inability of Europe to address previous disasters in its neighbourhood, the EU has engaged 
in conflict resolution across political, economic and societal lines with varying levels of 
impact. This approach depends on the appreciation of the link between development and 
security. Geographic proximity has underlined the importance of Europeanization as the most 
important leverage of the EU in resolving conflicts. Thus, the EU has applied eventual 
membership as a component of conflict resolution through SAP in Kosovo (more obvious 
with formal candidate status in Macedonia). The established relationship between 
development, democracy, rule of law, socio-economic prosperity and reconciliation between 
groups and security also shows that interests are embedded in normative concerns. 
 
In this sense, “the Union is in a strong position to exert a normative influence by way of its 
vast number of approaches and its capability to combine attractive positive incentives with 
harsh negative sanctions to an extent few other actors can match” (Bjorkdahl, 2005:264); and 
it provides “opportunities for interaction, communication, persuasion and expert advice which 
in turn may contribute to change normative convictions” (ibid: 265). However, as stated at the 
beginning, when the overall policy impact of the EU as a conflict resolution actor is analyzed 
within the dynamic interaction between the conditioning factors, EU engagement in conflict 
resolution and local capacities development, the outcome is mixed which is variegated by 
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many challenges and future prospects. The table summarises the analysis and pinpoints the 
weaknesses and challenges, as well as the strengths and prospects of EU conflict resolution. 
 
 EU Policy Impact Weaknesses/Challenges Strengths/Prospects 
Contextual Factors 
-Coordination problems with other 
international actors 
-Questions regarding the 
legitimacy of EU involvement 
(such as ICJ case) 
-Failure to deliver agreement 
between conflict parties 
-Becoming the leading actor of 
conflict resolution in the Western 
Balkans 
 
EU Conflict Resolution 
-Lack of political will of some 
member states: ad hoc decisions 
regarding common foreign policy 
-Incoherence at decision and 
policy-making: turf battles between 
Council and Commission 
-Need to pool and upgrade existing 
capabilities at EU level 
-Failure to meet high expectations 
of target countries, i.e. further 
integration, even membership 
-Comprehensive conflict 
resolution: combining development  
and security 
-Available capabilities 
-Membership perspective as a part 
of conflict resolution 
-Co-existence of norms and 
interests in policy. 
 
 
Local Capacities 
-Local ownership 
-Failure to achieve societal 
reconciliation 
-Lack of rule of law and 
democracy development, especially 
for judiciary. 
-Inclusive of non-sate parties 
integration 
 
 
Table 9.1 Policy Impact: Challenges and Prospects 
 
 
To summarize, conditioning factors are the most inconstant component due to the fact that 
conflicts are likely to demonstrate unique features of their own. Thus, conditioning factors are 
beyond the control of EU but still affect the overall policy impact of the EU through directly 
influencing EU’s engagement in conflict resolution and potential for local capacity 
development. Hence, conflict resolution requires a long term involvement with coherent 
rhetoric and practice on the side of the EU. The engagement of the EU in political capacity 
building, economic reconstruction and societal transformation is, on the other hand, mostly 
defined by its internal capacities and decision making processes. Despite slight differences 
between Kosovo and Macedonia, the EU has displayed incoherence problems. The 
development local capacities is still an ongoing process in both cases where incremental steps 
are hindered by inherent dilemmas of general conflict resolution approach, i.e. 
democratization through power sharing and neo-liberal agenda. Local capacities have not yet 
developed to ensure sustainable peace in Kosovo and this seems to be the main obstacle for 
the EU’s conflict resolution practice. Economic hardship, failure to introduce co-existence 
between the groups and vested interests in corruption and criminality, prove that local 
capacities are still missing. The aim of the EU as a conflict resolution actor should be to help 
Kosovo to govern itself and not to run the state for Kosovo. 
 
Overall, the impact of the EU as a conflict resolution actor in Kosovo is full of constraints and 
prospects, and will continues to evolve as long as the dynamic interaction between local and 
international context; EU conflict resolution with changing commitment and instruments; and 
continuously developing local capacities continue to shape each other. As long as the EU 
enables “a conflict-habituated system to become a peace system” through an integrated 
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conflict resolution framework, it would be considered as effective and legitimate (Byrne and 
Keasly, 2000). If conflict resolution is understood within the holistic approach of transition en 
masse, it is a very long-term prospect and would neither take place before the EU settles the 
institutional mess and ensures political will of member states, nor before Kosovo and other 
countries in the region have completed democratization and conflict resolution. However, the 
aspirations of those countries to finally achieve conflict resolution and the Europeanization as 
the final solution to the conflict continue to keep the endeavour for conflict resolution within 
the youngest state of the international society and the broader Balkan Peninsula alive.  
9.2 Agenda for Further Research 
There are always some problems or limitations of the tools that we employ in analyzing and 
representing ‘the reality’. Context-dependency of knowledge together with the acceptance of 
a basic reality that ‘human beings can lie themselves’ would be enough to summarize 
limitations of social science research. This study is no exception. First of all, the 
generalizability of this study is limited given that Kosovo is the main case study together with 
a short comparison with Macedonia. Secondly, the study has assessed the impact of the EU, 
which means focusing on only one actor among many on the ground. Moreover, the EU is 
characterised by internal divergences between its member states and institutions. Thirdly, the 
concern of the study is not a completed event and the EU’s impact is being shaped 
continuously. Lastly, the theory employed has certain limitations. Comprehensive conflict 
resolution theory has some limitations of applicability to the EU. The mutual ignorance 
between peace and conflict studies and studies on EU foreign policy and conflict resolution is 
a widening gap since both fields continue to develop in terms of scholarly debate and policy-
making. 
 
In that sense, further research could look into developing a theoretical framework in order to 
bridge the gap between EU studies and peace and conflict studies, as the latter has wide 
theoretical discussions and policy relevant analyses on which EU scholars of CFSP/ESDP can 
draw upon. Another possible area of development is to carry the research to another level: the 
target countries. So far, the assessment of policy impact of EU efforts has been conducted at 
the EU level only. The conclusions, appreciating or criticizing the EU, have not taken the 
actually affected parties into consideration. There is a perceived ‘lack of external perspectives 
in EUFP’. One of the possible consequences of ignoring target countries’ perceptions could 
be the “deepening gap between the EU’s self-image and external perceptions and increased 
ineffectiveness of EU foreign policy as a result of being too abstract and/or hypocritical or 
complacent.” (Tsuroka, 2006). Consequently, the expectations on the part of third parties 
might diminish and the EU might lose one of the most important external stimuli of its actions 
abroad (ibid.). Thus, studies employing the horizon of target countries would not only reveal 
the policy impact of the EU in conflict resolution, but also provide feedback to the EU 
common foreign policy identity problems by addressing incoherence at the institutional and 
policy implementation level. Overall, conflict resolution offers a wide area of research 
opportunities for students of EU foreign policy. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Especially after the end of the Cold War, the international community has witnessed the rising 
tensions within state borders between different communal groups. The so-called ‘intra-state 
identity wars’ do not have a geographic concentration and have dragged many countries into 
ethno-political armed conflicts. The importance of the new context of for the EU has been the 
increased awareness of the need for a common foreign policy in order to respond to the 
conflicts and prevent the escalation of instability into its domestic zone of peace. The 
devastating wars in the former Yugoslav Republic region have provided the long-awaited 
external stimuli for the EU in order to devise conflict resolution capacities and a quasi-
common foreign policy identity. In this sense, given the relative inability and unwillingness to 
engage in previous wars in the region, the disaster in Kosovo has provided both a learning 
process and a test case for the EU regarding conflict resolution. It has been the turning point 
in its approach towards the Western Balkans as being the deepest involvement of the EU in 
conflict resolution ever. 
 
Kosovo conflict resolution covers a wide area of instruments and policies across the first and 
second pillar. The design of the EU’s involvement in Kosovo is very complex and involves 
almost every aspect of governance, state building, society building and economic 
reconstruction. Moreover, the most important foreign policy tool of the Union, namely 
integration prospect, has also been activated as a very long-term perspective besides 
comprehensive conflict resolution. Thus, in terms of the instruments and the level of 
engagement, the EU is the actor with the highest leverage in conflict resolution in Kosovo. 
After the declaration of independence, the EU is now the most desired actor on the ground by 
Kosovar Albanians. This situation is challenging as a research enterprise for two reasons. 
First, it is important to measure the impact of this shift in EUFP orientation, i.e. how the EU 
has affected the conflict resolution. Second, it is important to analyse the EU as a third party 
in conflict resolution and point to the results of its engagement evaluated within the 
framework of broader conflict studies. Thus, the main concern of this study is the policy 
impact of EU engagement in conflict resolution, how it is practiced or in other words, how the 
EU contributes to conflict resolution in the countries that are emerging from violent ethno-
political conflict.  
 
For this reason, conflict resolution in Kosovo has been chosen as a case study in order to 
analyze the impacts of a cross-pillarized way of engagement and combination of stability, 
transition and prospect of integration within the framework of conflict resolution. At the end, 
a comparison between the EU’s impact in Kosovo and Macedonia is conducted with the 
objective of improving the understanding of how efforts by the EU contributes to conflict 
resolution through examining the implications, outcomes and effects of relevant EU policies 
and actions.  
 
The paper is delimited to ethno-political conflicts with a focus on the post-conflict 
transformation and stabilisation phase. Conflict resolution is conceptualised in a holistic sense 
embracing all the efforts combining social, economic and political levels and activities 
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concerning mediation, negotiation, peace-building, state building, reconciliation and structural 
change. In order to nest this broad conceptualization of conflict resolution into the EU 
structures, EU foreign policy is also conceptualized in the broadest sense covering cross-pillar 
activities and all kinds of external actions of the Union. The EU is considered to be a third 
party to the conflict and evaluated on the grounds of its impact on resolving the conflict 
through various instruments. 
 
The methodological framework for the research was designed to analyze the impact of EU 
conflict resolution as a dynamic relationship between three factors: conditioning factors of 
conflict, comprehensive conflict resolution and the level of local capacities developed. 
Within this framework, the study aims at addressing two key research questions:  
 
• To what extent/how do the EU structures and capabilities provide opportunities and/or 
constraints for comprehensive conflict resolution? (analysis of multiple EU mechanisms 
and institutions for comprehensive conflict resolution policies and actions) 
• What is the policy impact of the EU in Kosovo conflict resolution and how is this impact 
shaped given the structures and capabilities available to the EU? (case study) 
 
In order to address these questions, the study has conducted a theoretically informed in-depth 
case study with the main aim of focusing on the EU as the unit of analysis. 
 
The theoretical framework proposes that EU studies should borrow some insight from the 
field of conflict studies. In evaluating the impact of the EU, the study employed the theory of 
comprehensive peacebuilding across three pillars: political capacity building, economic 
reconstruction and societal transformation. The preference for these thematic areas reflects the 
general approach in comprehensive conflict resolution theory and the need to address the 
main dilemmas of conflict resolution, because at the end of a violent conflict, there is no sign 
of central authority, legal order, security, economic infrastructure and peaceful coexistence of 
people. Besides these three thematic areas, the EU also used the membership prospect as a 
part of conflict resolution in the Western Balkans.  
 
The analysis of the Kosovo case has revealed many challenges for the EU in conflict 
resolution. These cover the three areas related with context, EU engagement in conflict 
resolution and local capacities. The broad reading and selective application of international 
law regarding the independence of Kosovo has caused doubts concerning the legitimacy of 
the EU as a conflict resolution actor. It has also highlighted the internal divisions between the 
member states of the EU. The failure to help Kosovo to recover from the economic impasse 
and to tackle illegal economic activities and corruption after ten years of engagement is 
another challenge for the EU. The EU is also criticised that it ignores the development of 
local ownership and rather introduces patronage relations with Kosovo. The incoherence 
among the institutions due to ambiguous competences support ad hoc decision-making and 
create delays and confusion on the ground. Lastly, Kosovo has clear expectations regarding 
membership in the long term and sees this solution as the final outcome of state building and 
conflict resolution. Although the EU confirmed integration as a long-term prospect, currently 
it has no incentive to activate this tool and the continuous delay might decrease the impact of 
the EU as an actor of conflict resolution.  
 
The comparison with Macedonia has revealed the importance of two factors in conflict 
resolution: the conditioning factors of different war legacies and the different status of the two 
countries affecting the legitimacy of the EU; and the different tools of engagement and the 
  61 
extra leverage of candidacy in Macedonia. The conditioning factors have been in favour of 
conflict resolution in Macedonia. Compared to the other examples in the region, the level of 
multi-ethnic coexistence was well advanced and minorities were integrated into the 
governance system. The approach of the EU has been different compared to Kosovo simply 
because the EU was dealing with an established state. Macedonia shows that candidate status 
clearly matters because it provides people a common aim to work towards membership, 
which was made conditional upon conflict resolution. Still, problems also remain in 
Macedonia. The police mission reveals local ownership as a main problem in EU 
engagements. In that sense, the EU has to move from a top-down approach and incorporate 
local parties into the setting. Finally, it has to clarify the goals of its engagement. 
 
The overall analysis of the EU and the two cases provides important insights regarding the 
EU’s policy impact. In terms of conditioning factors, the EU is constrained by the 
coordination problems with the other actors on the ground. As shown in Kosovo, the 
undefined status of the UN and other actors restricts the effectiveness of the EU. The 
challenge of contested independence of Kosovo and the failure to deliver an agreement 
between the parties also impair the EU’s policy. On the other hand, the EU is rising as the 
main actor of conflict resolution in the Balkans, likely to assume greater roles in its closest 
neighbourhood, which would provide more competence and more tools to employ for conflict 
resolution.  
 
The existing EU conflict resolution structure is characterised by a lack of political will on the 
sides of the member states and by institutional incoherence at the EU level together with the 
need to further upgrade the available mechanisms. However, the extensive involvement in 
two cases shows that the EU has adopted a comprehensive conflict resolution approach in line 
with its developed capabilities. Moreover, it employs the ‘carrot of membership’ as a part of 
conflict resolution. There is still a step to be kept mind for the EU: long term failure to 
address the issue of membership will certainly decrease the overall impact and credibility of 
the EU as a conflict resolution actor as well as the incentives to comply with peace in the 
region.  
 
Lastly, local capacities are yet to be established in Kosovo. Local ownership, as a common 
problem of all third parties dealing with conflict resolution, is deemed very important for 
achieving a sustainable peace. The EU seems to develop more top-down or patronage 
relations instead of supporting embryonic local capacities in the post-conflict setting. 
However, there are promising efforts of inclusion of civil society -albeit some problems- and 
local partners, which needs to be strengthened further.  
 
Overall, the policy impact of the EU is shaped by the mutual relation of confining factors, EU 
engagement and local capacities developed which points out both challenges and prospects 
for the future. Considering the ongoing engagement of the EU in conflict resolution with 
constantly evolving roles and developing instruments, broader research drawing upon peace 
and conflict studies is deemed necessary. Moreover, conducting analysis at the level of target 
countries would be useful for filling a gap in the EU foreign policy and conflict resolution 
field. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A - EU Foreign Policy: Constructivist 
Perspective 
The model below is a basic illustration of how the input shapes the EU foreign policy system 
and its outcomes. In line with a constructivist approach, which that assumes there is a 
continuous relation between the agent and the structure(s), the outcome will provide feedback 
for new inputs. This illustration provides a basic heuristic toolbox for how EU foreign policy 
is conceptualised within the social constructivist logic and within the scope of this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Appendix A.1, Adapted from Ginsberg, 2001: 23.  
 
 
 
INPUT 
Conflict context: 
nature and legacy of 
the conflict 
INPUT 
European context:  
values, European identity, 
EU decision making 
structures, political culture 
EU Foreign Policy System 
 
Community tools and CFSP/ESDP (civilian 
and military conflict resolution) 
OUTCOME 
Policy effects of conflict 
resolution in Kosovo and  
Macedonia (analysed across 
three thematic areas) 
FEEDBACK 
Presence, actorness and significance 
in conflict resolution 
 
FEEDBACK 
Presence, actorness and significance 
in conflict resolution 
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Appendix B - European Union Conflict Resolution 
Structure-Institutions 
The treaty of Nice established military crisis management operations under ESDP. Like in 
CFSP, the member states are in control of military and civilian operations. Joint actions are 
decided in the General Affairs Council while the Presidency of the Council and the High 
Representative has the power of initiative. The Political and Security Committee follows 
international developments, defines policies based on joint actions and keeps track of 
implementation.  
 
DG RELEX manages the Instrument for Stability (IFS), which was established in 2007 and 
replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. It provides the first pillar component of conflict 
resolution. It is expected to provide assistance mediation, monitoring of the peace agreement, 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support rule of law and civilian 
administration, as well as electoral support. The table below is a summary of existing EU 
capabilities in the field of conflict resolution. The table shows the institutional framework 
available to the EU for crisis management and conflict resolution. 
 
 
Police 
Capabilities 
Rule of Law Civilian 
Administration 
Civil 
Protection 
Monitoring 
Capability 
Generic Support 
Capabilities 
Advisory, 
assistance and 
training of 
local police 
Substitution 
of local forces 
where local 
police units 
are missing 
due to war 
Integrated 
Police Units: 
pool of police 
at the EU 
level 
deployable in 
30 days 
Europe 
Gendarmerie 
Forces: 
France, Italy, 
Spain, 
Portugal and 
the 
Netherlands 
Strengthening 
and 
substituting 
local judiciary 
and legal 
system 
 
Pool of 
deployable 
staff in 30 
days 
Pool of more 
than 500 
experts 
Offer basic 
services of 
administration 
at regional level 
Assessment 
and 
coordination 
teams to be 
dispatched 
within seven 
hours; 
intervention 
teams and 
specialised 
services for 
civil 
protection 
Border, 
human 
rights, 
general 
political 
situation 
monitoring 
Support the 
work of the 
Special 
Representatives 
in the field of 
human rights, 
political affairs, 
security sector 
reform, 
mediation, 
border control, 
disarmament, 
demobilization 
and reintegration 
and media policy 
Pool of 400 
personnel  
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European Council 
Heads of States and 
Governments 
European 
Commission 
DG RELEX, ECHO, 
EuropeAid 
General Affairs 
Council 
Foreign Ministers of 
Member States 
COREPER 
Political 
Committee 
Political and 
Security 
Committee 
Committee on 
Civilian Crisis 
Management 
Military Committee 
(EUMUC) 
High Representative 
Policy Unit 
 
EU Monitoring 
Mission 
EUMM 
Special 
Representatives 
Joint Situation 
Centre 
Military Staff 
(EUMS) 
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Appendix C - Features of Power-Sharing in Multi-
Ethnic States 
 
The basic characteristics of power-sharing in multi-ethnic societies are demonstrated below. 
The whole design aims at the negative and positive protection of ethnic groups. It is 
“negative” in the sense that they protect the minority from certain governmental policies, 
which would endanger the existence of the group; “positive” in the sense that they call for 
measures which would enable minorities to sustain their distinctiveness” (Schneckener, 2004: 
25).  
 
 
 
Power sharing 
executive 
Proportional 
representation 
Veto rights Segmented 
autonomy 
Arbitration 
*Cabinets include 
each group in the 
society.  
 
*There are grand 
coalitions and 
decisions are taken 
by consensus in the 
legislative.  
 
*Presidential 
systems rely on the 
direct vote for the 
president. 
*In all segments of 
the state (executive, 
legislative, 
judiciary, public 
service and 
military), there are 
agreed 
proportions/quotas 
for each group 
defined by formal 
agreements. 
*Each group 
has veto rights 
in the decision-
making 
process at the 
state level. 
 
*If overused, 
they can put 
power-sharing 
in a stalemate. 
*Shared rule at 
the common state 
level is 
accompanied 
with self-rule 
based on 
territorial/federal 
type structures, or 
separate elections 
and communal 
chambers for the 
communities.  
 
*The decision 
making authority 
is delegated to 
the separate 
segments at the 
local level 
regarding the 
matters that are 
the minority’s 
‘exclusive 
concern’. 
 
* Ad hoc 
committees at the 
parliamentary 
level, special 
commissions for 
settling disputes 
or courts for 
impartial 
arbitration at the 
judicial level 
ensure the 
implementation 
of agreements. 
Table Appendix C.1 
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Appendix D - EU Institutions in Kosovo 
Name Established in-Lasted until Mandate 
TAKFO (Taskforce for the 
Reconstruction of Kosovo) 1999-2000 
*Administering emergency 
aid; 
*Absorbed by EAR. 
EAR (European Agency for 
Reconstruction) 
2000-2008* 
 
 
 
 
 
*Most of its activities 
including the administration 
of the CARDS Programme 
was transferred to the EU 
Liaison office in 2008. 
*Humanitarian aid; 
*Financing projects on 
institution building, 
economic recovery and 
political reform; 
*It has become the largest 
EU presence in Pristina and 
the largest aid donor, 
administering the CARDS 
Programme in Kosovo. 
 
EUMM (EU Monitoring 
Mission) 2000-ongoing 
* EUMM dealt with security 
sensitive matters by reporting 
to Brussels and acted as the 
main channel of information 
on the ground. 
EUSR (European Union 
Special Representative)- 
Peter Feith* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*EUSR holds the mandate of 
ICR 
2004-ongoing 
*The EUSR offers advice 
and support to the 
government of Kosovo in the 
political process towards 
European integration; 
provides overall coordination 
for the EU presence in 
Kosovo; contributes to the 
development and 
consolidation of respect for 
human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in 
Kosovo. 
EUPT (European Union 
Planning Team) 2006-2008 
*Precedent for the EU Rule 
of law mission, established to 
prepare for the mission; 
*composed of an office of 
the Head of the planning 
team, a police team, a justice 
team and an administration 
team; 
*residual EUPT operation 
will continue to support the 
build-up of EULEX, mainly 
in the fields of finance and 
procurement. 
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ICO/ICR (International 
Civilian Office/International 
Civilian Representative) 
2008-ongoing 
*Appointed by the 
International Steering Group 
* ICO/ICR aims at ensuring 
the full implementation of 
Kosovo’s status settlement 
and supports Kosovo’s 
European integration through 
advising Kosovo’s 
government and community 
leaders; 
*Works closely together with 
the EU presences in Kosovo: 
the European Union Special 
Representative, the European 
Commission Liaison Office 
and the EULEX rule of law 
mission. 
EULEX (EU Role of Law 
Mission in Kosovo) 2008-ongoing 
*The largest civilian mission 
ever launched under 
European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP); 
*The central aim is to assist 
and support Kosovo 
authorities in the rule of law 
area, specifically in the 
police, judiciary and customs 
areas. 
ECLO (EU Commission 
Liaison Office) 2004-ongoing 
*The mandate of ECLO is to 
deploy all enlargement tools 
under the Stabilisation and 
Association Process, such as 
regular reporting and 
European Partnership; 
*providing permanent 
technical and political 
dialogue with Kosovar 
authorities to provide sound 
policy advise and guidance to 
reform efforts;  
*administering substantial 
financial assistance (nearly 
EUR 2 billion to date) to 
build and improve Kosovo’s 
institutions, foster socio-
economic development and 
further advance Kosovo’s 
regional integration; 
*fostering Kosovo’s 
participation in regional and 
Europe-wide initiatives. 
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Table Appendix D.1 
* Following the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo on 17 February 
2008, upon the request of Kosovo’s leaders, a group of States formed the International 
Steering Group (ISG) on 28 February 2008. The Member States of the ISG are Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. 
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Appendix E - Vertical Structure of Authority in 
Kosovo under International Authority 
The central authority is composed of a directly elected Assembly. The executive is the 
President and the government, both appointed by the Assembly in accordance with the 
SRSG’s consent. The court system has been designed in accordance with democratic systems 
at multiple levels76. The independent bodies included in the state system are different from the 
traditional state apparatus. Together with an ombudsperson they provide checks and balances 
mechanisms for the implementation of rules and procedures77. Local system governance is 
also divided into legislative, executive and judicial functions, and municipalities have some 
own budgetary competences. 
 
After the independence EUSR/ICR has replaced the SRSG as the head of the international 
community in Kosovo. Furthermore, the Kosovo legislative and executive have become the 
main authority of Kosovo. However, the Kosovo central authority and EUSR/ICR work in 
close cooperation and full authority has not been transferred to the Kosovo legislative yet. 
The three layer hierarchical structure between the international community, the Kosovo 
central authority and Kosovo local authorities still continues to some extent, although Kosovo 
authorities continuously emphasize that they see the EU as a partner together which the 
Kosovo government, shaping the future of the Kosovo state together, rather than perceiving 
them as ‘colonizer’ or ‘boss’78.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
76
 Supreme Court of Kosovo, District Courts, Municipal Courts, and Minor Offence Courts. 
77
 The independent bodies include the Central Election Commission, Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, Auditor-General, 
Banking and payments Authority, Media Commission, Board of Public Broadcasters and Housing and Property 
Directorate/Claims Commission (Wollf, 2008:425).  
78
 Interview held by Bekim Sejdiu, the Ambassador of Kosovo to Ankara, May, 13, 2009, Embassy of Kosovo, Ankara. 
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Source: Wolff, Stefan, Power-sharing and the vertical Layering of Authority: A Review of Current Practices, in 
Marc Weller, Complex Power Sharing, 2008. 
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Appendix F – Macedonia 
Historical Background of the Macedonian Conflict 
Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia peacefully in 1991. During the wars between Serbs, 
Croats and Bosniaks, the country was considered to be the best example of a post-Yugoslav 
state. However, mutual distrust between the conflict parties had long been present since 
independence in 1991, and so before the conflict broke out in 200179. However, the relatively 
peaceful situation in Macedonia has collapsed and the ethnic relations between the Albanian 
minority and Macedonian Slavs have deteriorated since 2001 and brought the country to the 
edge of a total civil war. During the 1990s, Albanians –concentrated in the western part of the 
country- wanted some revisions of the constitution and demanded more rights regarding 
Albanian as an official language, high education and more representation of the Albanian 
population at the public level, as well as veto rights in the parliament. The tensions escalated 
when NATO intervened in Kosovo- the neighbouring country where the Kosovar counterpart 
of the underground Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) had been fighting against the 
Serb oppression. The conflict concentrated around the border with Kosovo between the NLA 
and the Macedonian police and military (Scheneckener, 2002 and Daftary, 2001). The failure 
to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia has caused a spillover of the conflict 
when experienced members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) supported the conflict 
between the NLA and the Macedonia police and army. 
  
Intervention by the EU in mediating the negotiations between the two parties- representatives 
from the main Macedonian parties and Albanian parties- has created an agreement on a 
constitutional framework giving the Albanian minority wide administrative and cultural 
rights. The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed in 2001 based on principles 
including the recognition of Macedonia as a multi-ethnic society to be reflected in public life 
and development of local level governance. The subsequent legislation ensured extensive 
language and educational rights for Albanians, established power-sharing and proportionality 
in public service.  
 
Power-Sharing in Macedonia 
 
According to the OFA, Macedonia retains its unitary-state character with two layers of 
government. However, the power between the central government and municipalities is 
clearly separated giving extensive autonomy to the local governance. The central level 
government represents the legislative, executive and judiciary division. Municipalities enjoy 
rights over “public services, culture, education, social welfare, health care, environment, 
urban and rural planning, economic development, and local finance” (Wolff, 2008:427). The 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
79
 Contrary to the general argument, Treneska argues that between 1991 and 2001, the rights granted to the 
national minorities were “better than required by international acts for national minorities’ protection” 
(Treneska, 2004:225). The minorities had representation in the parliament, and the central government 
established by mainstream Macedonian parties had always included one ethnic Albanian party. However, the 
mainstream view is more closer to the one stated above, which is supported by the fact that the UN dispatched a 
preventive force between 1992-1998, the OSCE initiated measures to improve interethnic relations and the EU 
got involved with financial instruments and asymmetric trade preferences.  
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Council has budgetary powers, carries out public services, controls the governance of the 
administrative organs and executes public services at the municipal level and mayor acts as 
the executive power at the local level. The locals are also given an optional third layer where 
they can set up neighbourhood self-government within the municipalities. This third layer 
“leaves significant room to address specific local concerns in ways that are felt most 
appropriate by those immediately concerned” (Wolff, 2008:428). This is illustrated in the 
table below: 
 
  
 
 
 
National Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Municipal Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
Neighbourhood Self- OPTIONAL 
Government  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assembly President and Government 
Judicial 
system 
Council 
Mayor 
governing and 
administrative 
organs 
Judicial 
system 
  84 
 
EU Institutions in Macedonia 
Name Established in-Lasted until Mandate  
EUMM, PHARE and, 
humanitarian assistance 
through ECHO 
Pre-conflict period (before 
2001) 
Various financial and 
humanitarian assistance 
For further information on 
EU involvement in 
Macedonia before the 
conflict see Hansen, 1999. 
EAR (European Agency for 
Reconstruction) 
2001-2008 Administration of CARDS 
In 2007, IPA replaced 
CARDS and other pre- 
OBNOVA accession support 
to all candidate and potential 
candidate countries and has 
been set for the period of 
2007-2013. 
EIDHR (The European 
Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights) 
1999-ongoing  
Concordia 
First military mission taken 
over from NATO. 
2003 Support stability and 
confidence building, 
implementing the OFA 
Proxima 
The replacement of Proxima 
was due to bureaucratic 
reasons not ineffectiveness. 
The government of 
Macedonia did not want the 
presence of an institution 
whose mandate was crisis 
management. Thus, an EU 
Police Advisory Team 
replaced it. 
2003-2005 Mentoring, monitoring, 
advising middle and senior 
management police officers 
focusing on border 
management, confidence 
building in police (Council 
Joint Action, 
2003/681/CFSP)  
EUPAT (EU Police Advisory 
Team) 
2005-2006 Monitoring and mentoring 
the Macedonian police with 
priority in border policing, 
fight against corruption and 
organised crime, and public 
  85 
accountability (Council Joint 
Action 2005/826/CFSP). 
EUSR 
In 2005 the EU combined the 
old position of EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) and 
that of European 
Commission Head of 
Delegation into a single 
individual one, thus creating 
a double-headed mission for 
more effectiveness. 
2001-ongoing  
RRM (Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism) 
2001-2002 Launching programmes in 
police reform. 
ECJHAT (European 
Commission JHA Mission) 
2002-2003 Supporting reform in police 
and judiciary, seconding 
experts from member states 
and setting key documents 
for reform. 
ECPRP (European 
Commission Police Reform 
Project) 
2004-2005 Implementation of the reform 
process initiated by the 
legislations in 2004. 
Twinning maybe explain 
briefly what that is 
 Tackling organised crime 
Table Appendix F.1 
